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This paper discusses controversies on freedom of 
expression and the arts, focusing on Islam and Muslim 
sensibilities. Drawing from historical examples, the perception 
of visual arts, and music in the Islamic tradition, it attempts to 
shed light upon incidents such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks and 
the intentional destruction of cultural heritage by extremists in 
Mali, Syria and Iraq in the case of global-scale controversies. 
After examining the concepts of blasphemy (sabb), apostasy 
(ridda) and idolatry (shirk) in Islamic law, it considers the 
legitimacy of legal claims related to blasphemous expressions 
from an international law perspective. The paper distinguishes 
between violent and non-violent claims, and argues that 
freedom of expression should prevail in all cases involving 
blasphemy and offenses to sensibilities. It also takes the view, 
however, that this solution is not necessarily a sustainable one. 
Empowering cultural rights as a whole, rather than seeking to 
resolve a fictitious conflict between rights, seems to be a more 
effective pathway to address complex issues involving religious 
extremism and hate speech. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 In January 2015, eight gunmen entered the Charlie Hebdo 
satirical magazine office in Paris, and killed twelve well-known 
French journalists, editors, and political cartoonists. The 
magazine had been publishing controversial cartoons of Islam 
and depictions of the Prophet Mohammed for the last few 
years.1 The attacks created global outrage and sorrow to the 
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1 See UNDERSTANDING CHARLIE HEBDO CARTOONS, http://www. 
understandingcharliehebdo.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
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world of the press.2 World leaders condemned terrorist violence.3 
Massive rallies and demonstrations were organized in France 
and across the world—some in favour of,4 and others against,5 
freedom of speech. At the same time, top newspapers chose not 
to republish the cartoons, 6  and university conferences were 
cancelled for fear of extremist attacks.7 The repercussions on 
Muslim minorities also became visible,8 raising a number of 
questions regarding religious discrimination and racism in the 
post 9/11 world.   
 The Charlie Hebdo attacks reminded the international 
community in many respects of the Danish cartoons controversy 
that erupted ten years earlier, resulting in the burning of 
embassy buildings, death threats against cartoonists, severance 
of diplomatic relations, and boycotts against Danish products.9 
                                                
2 See Anoosh Chakelian, In Cartoons: The Global Response to the Attack 
on Charlie Hebdo, NEW STATESMAN (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/01/cartoons-global-response-
attack-charlie-hebdo (on  cartoonists’ responses). 
3  See Dan Friedman, Obama Condemns ‘Cowardly, Evil’ Attack on 
Charlie Hebdo, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obama-condemns-cowardly-evil-
attack-charlie-hebdo-article-1.2069008; see also Kim Willsher, France Has 
Foiled Five Terror Plots Since Charlie Hebdo Attack, Says French PM, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/23/ 
france-foils-five-terror-attacks-says-prime-minister. 
4  See Michael Martinez et al., Marchers Rally in Solidarity in France 
and Europe After Charlie Hebdo Attack, CNN (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/07/world/france-rally-reaction-charlie-hebdo-
attack/. 
5  See Charlie Hebdo Unrest: Muslims Protest Over Magazine's 
Muhammed Portrayal, TELEGRAPH (July 11, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11356297/In-
pictures-Protests-against-Charlie-Hebdo-magazine.html?frame=3170004; 
Lizzie Dearden, Charlie Hebdo Protests: Five Dead as Churches and French 




6  See Michael Calderone, New York Times Only Top U.S. Newspaper 
Not to Publish Charlie Hebdo Cover, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2015),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/14/new-york-times-charlie-hebdo---
_n_6470338.html. 
7  See Henry McDonald, University Reconsidering Decision to Cancel 
Charlie Hebdo Conference, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/apr/24/queens-university-belfast-
charlie-hebdo-conference. 
8  See Antonia Blumberg, Mosques Attacked In Wake Of Charlie Hebdo 
Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/01/08/mosque-attacks-charlie-hebdo_n_6436224.html. 
9  See generally JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 
(2009); David Keane, Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression, 30 HUM. 
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They are also reminiscent of the first time a blasphemy case 
seized global interest, when, on February 14, 1989—a day 
coinciding with the end of the Soviet-Afghan war–—the Iranian 
leader Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed an award for the 
assassination of the Nobel-award winning writer, Salman 
Rushdie, for his novel The Satanic Verses.10 From then on, acts 
of Islamic extremism and claims related to offenses of religious 
beliefs have been gradually more frequent in both the Muslim 
world and the West. In the United Kingdom, in particular, 
controversies over cartoons have been associated with the rise 
in discrimination policies and identity denial against migrants. 
They have also been associated with the “war against terror,”11 
affecting Muslim populations in one way or another. On a larger 
scale, they have been echoing identity theories that have held a 
dominant position in the American political thought of the 
1990s, particularly Huntington’s hypothesis of a fictitious “clash 
of civilizations.” Huntington’s article was published for the first 
time in the Foreign Affairs journal in 1993.12 Its impact has 
been nothing less than significant. The article alone has been 
cited over 10,000 times, and the alleged “cultural clash” is now 
referred to virtually in all controversies over cultural and 
religious sensibilities. In the words of the Association for World 
Education, “[s]ince 1989, a new form of religious-inspired 
terrorism has developed, leading to the 9 September 2001 
climacteric, all of which has been characterised by some as a 
'clash of civilizations' and differently by others.”13  
                                                                                                         
Apostates: Shari'a 2006, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 303, 308–09 (2006); see also Binoy 
Kampmark, The Cartoon Riots: A New Cultural Diplomacy, 7 WHITEHEAD J. 
DIPL. & INT'L REL. 69, 69 (2006). 
10  See M.M. Slaughter, Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honor, and 
Freedom of Speech, 79 VA. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (1993); Pinaki Chakravorty, 
Note, The Rushdie Incident as Law-and-Literature Parable, 104 YALE L.J. 
2213, 2216 (1995); Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, The Contingent Universality of 
Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic 
Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29, 30 (1997). For a timeline of the events, see 
generally THE RUSHDIE FILE (Lisa Appignanesi & Sara Maitland eds., 1989).  
11  In particular, in relation to the UK, see Javaid Rehman, Islam, "War 
on Terror" and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: 
Dilemmas of Multiculturalism, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 831, 848–53 (2007). 
12  See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN 
AFF. 22, 25 (1993). For relevant analysis and criticisms see also Tom Farer, 
The Clash of Cultures, the Tension Within Liberalism, and the Proper Limits of 
Tolerance, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 18–19 (2014); Emon, supra note 9, at 309–10; 
Keane, supra note 9, at 869–70.  
13  U.N., Econ. & Sec. Council, The ‘Rushdie Affair’/Rushdie Syndrome: 
The Right To Life And The Human Rights Mechanisms,(Written Statement 
Submitted by the Ass’n of World Educ., ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/NGO/252 
(Mar. 11, 2004). But see Tariq Ramadan, The Paris Attackers Hijacked Islam 
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 This paper aims to clarify the legal interest of the 
question of offenses to sensibilities, focusing on incidents 
involving Islam and Muslim beliefs. It argues that empowering 
cultural rights as a whole could potentially offer a more 
sustainable solution to the debate over freedom of expression 
and religious sensibilities and contribute to “cultural peace.” In 
order to substantiate its claims, it adopts an inductive approach. 
Section II discusses recent incidents involving offensive 
expression and Islamic beliefs, including international 
responsibility for acts of religious extremism. Section III 
dismisses the presumed “aniconic” nature of Islam, yet observes 
that the offenses of blasphemy, apostasy and idolatry under 
Sharia law are interrelated and particularly powerful. Section 
IV examines these offenses in Muslim states and international 
practice, and finds that their punishment is largely based on 
abusing the concept of religion at both a domestic level and 
international level. Section V examines the possible solutions to 
questions involving religious defamation and other “cultural 
controversies,” suggesting that sensibilities are legitimately 
excluded from the protective scope of the right to religious 
freedom. Section VI discusses the shortcomings of this “rights-
based” approach and suggests ways to avoid stereotypes about 
religions and “cultural clashes” in human rights law. In 
particular, the paper submits that seeking to resolve a fictitious 
“conflict” between freedom of expression and religious freedom 
is not an appropriate way to address global scale controversies. 
Rather, dissociating religions from illegitimate or extremist 
claims and empowering cultural rights as a whole may 
contribute to “cultural peace” in a more effective way. 
 
II. INCIDENTS INVOLVING ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND ISLAMIC 
SENSIBILITIES  
 
A. The Global Impact of Incidents Involving the Arts    
  
 Three preliminary clarifications that shape the context of 
our discourse seem apposite. First, the question of blasphemy is 
not confined solely within the Islamic legal tradition, nor are 
monotheisms alone the source of the problem. 14  Recently, 
                                                                                                         
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/ 
jan/09/paris-hijackers-hijacked-islam-no-war-between-islam-west (arguing 
that “this has nothing to do with the message of [the Muslim] religion.”). 
14  See Heiner Bielefeldt, Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
35 HUM. RTS. Q. 33, 36 (2013) (arguing that “[a]nti-universalistic policies in 
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Buddhists complained about the launch of a new Buddha bar in 
Jakarta,15 and few years ago, a radical Hindu group issued a 5 
million dollar threat for the head of one of India’s most 
acclaimed painters, Maqbool Fida Husain, for portraying Gods 
naked in his film “Meenaxi: A Tale of Three Cities.” 16  In 
addition, it is in the Judeo-Christian and not the Islamic 
tradition that the offences of blasphemy and idolatry are rooted. 
The relevant Biblical prohibitions—in particular the myth of the 
“Golden Calf” that is narrated in the first book of the Bible, the 
Exodus17—have served throughout the centuries as an excellent 
basis to justify prohibitions of both idol-worshipping and art-
making. Freedom of expression and artistic creation were 
restricted virtually in all phases of Christianity. In classical 
Judaism, painting was seen as a source of impurity and linked 
to all kinds of sinful behaviour.18 In the case of the Catholic 
Church artists had to conform to strict rules issued by 
Ecumenical councils—in particular, the Council of Trent, which, 
convened by Pope Pius in plain Quattrocento, provided thorough 
guidelines on the making of “sacred images”; 19  the Holy 
Inquisition has prosecuted not only scientists, but also painters 
as famous as Veronese,20 and the notorious “Index of Prohibited 
                                                                                                         
countries” and referring to other countries including China and Eritrea which 
only recognize certain religions); see also JEAN DELUMEAU, LE FAIT RELIGIEUX 
735 (1993).  
15 See ‘Buddha Bar' Pressured to Close in Indonesia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/03/12/ 
039buddha-bar039-pressured-close-indonesia.html. 
16  MEENAXI: A TALE OF THREE CITIES (2004). See Shilpa Jamkhandikar, 
“Picasso of India” M.F. Husain Dies in Exile Aged 95, REUTERS, June 9, 2011, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/idINIndia-57595020110609.  
17 See Exodus 20:5; 32:4–28. The Israelites asked Aaron to make for 
them an idol, so they could worship it as their God. Aaron took the women’s 
golden earrings and made of them a Calf, and they worshipped the Calf and 
sacrificed on it—something which has been a fatal crime for the new ‘Jealous’ 
God. In the continuation of the story, the worship of the Calf made the God 
angry, since he was the one and only—and consequently also a “jealous” God. 
He (i.e. God) threatened to “consume [the idolaters] and make of [the Jews] a 
great nation [instead].”  And he would have, had it not been for Moses, who 
saved his people by killing only three thousand of them to appease the God. 
18   ANTONY JULIUS, TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE ARTS: ART THAT OFFENDS 36 
(2002) (citing Exodus 15:2).  
19  See COUNCIL OF TRENT, THE CANONS AND DECREES OF THE SACRED AND 
OECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF TRENT 232–89 (James Waterworth ed. & trans., 
1848).  
20  See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 
624–25 (5th ed., 2007) (explaining his representation of the Last Supper that 
he later renamed into “Feast at the House of Levi” to avoid punishment and 
providing the transcript of the trial); Daniel McClean & Armen Avanessian, 
Trials of the Title, in THE TRIALS OF ART 54–55 (Daniel McClean ed., 2007).  
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Books” created in 1559 remained officially in power until 1966.21 
In addition, the list of censored artworks in many Western 
states of the Judeo-Christian tradition is sufficiently long not to 
remain unnoticed.22   
 Second, due to its social and symbolic functions,23 as well 
as its increased capacity to communicate ideas,24 visual art and 
other forms of figurative representation constitute extremely 
fertile ground for the expansion of “cultural conflicts.” 
Controversies involving religious beliefs have been pivoting 
around objects of either artistic or sacred significance: the 
Christian crucifixes in the case of the Italian public schools, 
minarets in the case of Switzerland, headscarves in France and 
the denigrated copies of the Qur’an in Germany have all served 
as symbols in debates over cultural and religious identities.25  
Third, the challenges for freedom of expression in the 
developed and developing world are substantially different. On 
the one hand, freedom has little meaning when poverty impedes 
knowledge, or when the absence of libraries, cinemas, or 
museums hinders cultural exchange and the diffusion of 
artworks.26 The same is true where states refuse to recognize 
minority identities, or when non-conformist artists and writers 
impose on themselves self-censorship or exile.27 On the other 
hand, the governments of many developing countries 
systematically impose restrictions at a variety of levels. In 
                                                
21   See Laurent Doussin, L’Index Librorum Prohibitorum de l’Eglise 
catholique: Une page d’histoire de la censure [The Index of Prohibited Books of 
the Catholic Church: A Page from the History of Censorship], 22 GAVROCHE: 
REVUE D'HISTOIRE POPULAIRE 128 (2003). 
22   See, e.g., RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE SCOPE OF TOLERANCE: 
STUDIES ON THE COSTS OF FREE EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2006) 
(focusing on cases from the United States, Israel, Canada and the UK). 
23  See HOWARD S. BECKER, ARTWORLDS (1982) (arguing that an artwork 
cannot be conceived separately from their social environment); Arthur Danto, 
The Artworld, 5 J. OF PHIL. 571 (1964). 
24  ERWIN PANOFSKY, MEANING IN THE VISUAL ARTS (1972). 
25  See generally RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: 
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE? (Titia Loenen & Jenny E. Goldschmidt eds., 2007); 
George Letsas, Is There A Right Not to Be Offended in One’s Religious Beliefs?, 
in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS 239 
(Lorenzo Zucca & Camil Ungureanu eds., 2015). 
26  See Emmanuel Decaux, Comment la Prise en Compte des Droits 
Culturels Interfère sur la Compréhension des Autres Droits de l’homme?, in 22 
LES DROITS CULTURELS: UNE CATEGORIE SOUS-DEVELOPPEE DE DROITS DE 
L'HOMME 185 (Patrice Meyer-Bisch ed., 1993) (explaining how cultural rights 
impede the understanding of human rights). 
27  See, e.g., Chinese Cartoonist Rebel Pepper Struggles to Survive in Self-
imposed Exile, IFEX (June 2, 2015), https://www.ifex.org/china/2015/06/ 
02/rebel_pepper_exile/ (commenting that even if someone is not 
imprisoned, the ruling party can make it impossible for him to live). 
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illiberal states such as China, North Korea or Myanmar—and 
states with high rates of media control such as Guatemala, 
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Russia or Turkey—censorship is a daily 
phenomenon that affects not only cultural exchange but first 
and foremost the internet and the world of the press.28 It goes 
without saying that the absence of infrastructure and high rates 
of illiteracy raise questions regarding the links between world 
poverty, human development and individual freedom. They also 
challenge the role of freedom of expression proponents, who, as 
An-Na’im points out, “should strive to show its importance to all 
citizens and society at large, and not just to a few educated 
elites.”29 
 In a generalized sense, however, it does appear that the 
number of prosecutions for blasphemy in the name of Islam has 
increased since the Islamization of many Muslim governments 
in the 1980s and 1990s.30 This is particularly true in relation to 
artistic and literary freedom. The case of Egypt, for example, is 
one that has acquired publicity after the assassination of 
eminent intellectual and writer Farag Foda,31 and the attempted 
assassination against Nobelist Naguib Mahfouz, who, despite 
being hailed “a cultural light who brought Arab literature to the 
world,”32 was considered an apostate by Islamists.33  
As for the controversies of the new millennium, however, 
and especially since 9/11, the intriguing feature is arguably 
their global impact. Once manifested only in extreme theocratic 
regimes like that of the Taliban—who dashingly filmed the 
destruction of the two giant Buddha statues of the Bamiyan 
                                                
28  See generally IFEX, https://www.ifex.org, for monthly country reports; 
INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, http://www.freemedia.at/country-
reports.html (same); see also Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field 
of Cultural Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights, Farida Shaheed, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/34 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
29  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: 
Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives—A Preliminary Inquiry, 
3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 45–46 (1990).  
30  Id. at 26–27; see also U.N. Econ. & Sec. Council, Cooperation with 
Representatives of United Nations Human Rights Bodies, ¶¶ 37–38, 
E/CN.4/1996/57 (Feb. 22, 1996) (providing information on human rights in 
Sudan). 
31 Declan O'Sullivan, Egyptian Cases of Blasphemy and Apostasy 
Against Islam: Takfir al-Muslim, 7 INT'L. J. HUM. RTS. 97, 105–07 (2003); 
Chakravorty supra note 10, 2222 n. 55. 
32  See President Pays Tribute to Mahfouz, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2006), 
http:// http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5297470.stm. 
33  Elham T. Hussein et al., The Relationship Between Naguib Mahfouz 
and the Islamists: The Real, the Exaggerated and the Fabricated, 3 ENG. LANG. 
& LITERATURE STUD. 28, 32 (2013); Slaughter, supra note 10, at 172; O'Sullivan 
supra note 31, at 107–12.  
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valley in 2001 following a religious edict “ordering the 
destruction of all statues and non-Islamic shrines” 34 —
iconoclasm and controversies over blasphemous books, films and 
cartoons are now becoming casual on social media. Apart from 
the Danish cartoons and Charlie Hebdo, one can add to the list 
numerous smaller-scale incidents that have fuelled extremist 
reactions not only in the Muslim world, but also, in the West. 
The most recent ones include protests over a movie trailer 
mocking the life of the Prophet Mohamed that provoked the 
attack of the American embassy in Libya in 2012;35 bloodshed 
following an exhibition with controversial cartoons of the 
Prophet in Texas in April 2015; 36  violent reactions over 
relatively innocent TV series such as Southpark 37  and The 
Simpsons;38 and even the targeting of monuments and paintings 
that have been present for years—for instance, the attempts to 
blow up San Petronio Church in Bologna in 2002, where 
Giovanni da Modena had centuries ago painted Mohammed in 
Hell.39 Blasphemy prosecutions and cultural heritage attacks 
have been also more frequent following the Arab uprisings in 
Northern Africa,40 amounting to significant cultural heritage 
destructions, such as the bombing of the Egyptian Museum of 
Islamic Art (and the National Library) in Cairo.41 Even more 
                                                
34  See UNESCO, Proceedings of the Doha Conference of ‘Ulamâ on Islam 
and Cultural Heritage, U.N. Doc. CLT/CH/THS/2001/CD/H/1, at 11 (Dec. 30–
31, 2001) [hereinafter “DOHA PROCEEDINGS”]; see also Francesco Francioni & 
Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and 
International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 619, 624 (2003). 
35  See Barney Henderson & Richard Spencer, U.S. Ambassador to Libya 
Killed in Attack on Benghazi, TELEGRAPH (Sep. 12, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/95373
66/US-ambassador-to-Libya-killed-in-attack-on-Benghazi-consulate.html. 
36  See Kevin Conlon & Kristina Sgueglia, Two Shot Dead After They 
Open Fire at Mohammed Cartoon Event in Texas, CNN (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/03/us/mohammed-drawing-contest-shooting/. 
37 See South Park Creators Warned over Muhammad Depiction, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8636455.stm.  
38  TV Channel Fined over Simpsons 'Blasphemy' in Turkey, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-20598262.   
39  See Philip Willan, Al-Qaida Plot to Blow Up Bologna Church Fresco, 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2002), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/24/ 
arts.artsnews.  
40  See, e.g., Jon Jensen and Tim Hume, Who Will Win Battle for New 
Tunisia?, CNN (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/11/world/meast/ 
tunisia-salafists-artists-battle/; Tunis: Imam of Tunis Mosque, 




41  See A UNESCO Emergency Mission to Launch Rehabilitation of the 
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alarmingly in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria, 
“there has been an increasing number of kidnappings and 
murders of citizen journalists and others publicly broadcasting 
views that are critical of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIS).”42 In 2014, ISIS requested schools in Mosul to 
stop teaching music and the arts43 and “has attacked social and 
cultural practices [in Syria]—including weddings, musical 
events and traditional ceremonies . . . demonstrating their 
intent to eradicate these aspects of Syrian culture.”44 In fact, 
along with the systematic violence exercised against all 
segments of civilian population, 45  and especially against 
minorities and LGBT communities,46 ISIS—and at a smaller 
scale other terrorist organizations—have been implementing 
iconoclastic cultural policies in the name of Islam. Hence, a 
number of cultural and historical sites have been under attack 
in Mali,47 while music has been banned in the north of the 
country since 2012, sending “to exile” a renowned festival, the 
Festival in the Desert.48 In September 2014, Islamists uploaded 
several videos on YouTube with persons attacking artefacts and 
                                                                                                         
org/new/en/media-services/in-focus-articles/a-unesco-emergency-mission-to-
rehabilitate-the-islamic-arts-museum-of-cairo/.  
42  Artist Alert: November 2013, ARTICLE 19 (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37384/en/artist-alert:-
november-2013. 
43  Umberto Bacci, ISIS Medieval School Curriculum: No Music, Art and 
Literature for Mosul Kids, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014, 6:19 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-medieval-school-curriculum-no-music-art-
literature-mosul-kids-1465590. 
44  U.N., Rep. of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic: Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, ¶ 20, 
U.N. Doc A/HRC/27/CRP.3 (Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter “H.R.C.”]. 
45  See id. at ¶ 19; see also U.N., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Human Rights Situation in Iraq in the Light of Abuses Committed by the So-
called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/28/18 (Mar. 13, 2015); U.N., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69, ¶ 59 (Feb. 5, 2015); U.N., Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 20–84, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014).  
46  See U.N., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Discrimination and Violence 
Against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 
¶¶ 29, 31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/23 (May 4, 2015). 
47  See S.C. Res. 2227, ¶ 14 (June 29, 2015) (urging the UN peace mission 
in Mali, the MINUSMA, to assist the Malian authorities in their restoration in 
collaboration with UNESCO). 
48  See Natasha Schmidt, The Sound of Silence: Mali’s Musicians, INDEX 
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other cultural treasures in Timbuktu, 49  Damascus 50  and 
Mosul. 51  In February 2015, ISIS burnt approximately eight 
thousands books and manuscripts of the Mosul library.52 And in 
June 2015, ISIS released another video with terrorists reducing 
the ancient Assyrian Palace in Iraq, a UNESCO heritage site, to 
ashes. 53  This form of extremism has now reached an 
unprecedented scale, largely justifying the characterization by 
the Director-General of UNESCO of attacks against cultural 
heritage as amounting to “cultural cleansing.”54  
 
B. Triggering International Responsibility  
 
 Violent iconoclastic incidents may take place in the name 
of religions—yet, should not be mistakenly associated to them. 
                                                
49  Ishaan Tharoor, Timbuktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists are Wrecking 
Mali’s Cultural Heritage, TIME July 2, 2012, http://world.time.com/ 
2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wrecking-malis-
cultural-heritage/.  
50  Rep. of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Human Rights Situation in Iraq in Light of Abuses Committed by the So-
called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups, supra note 
45, at ¶¶ 120-1; ICOMOS, Statement on Crac des Chevaliers and the 
continuing destruction of the cultural heritage of Syria, Paris, (July 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.icomos.org/en/home/177-articles-en-francais/ 
actualites/632-icomos-statement-on-crac-des-chevaliers-and-the-
continuing-destruction-of-the-cultural-heritage-of-syria. 
51  See e.g. Anne Barnard, ISIS Attacks Nimrud, a Major Archaeological 
Site in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/ 
world/middleeast/isis-attacks-iraqi-archaeological-site-at-
nimrud.html?_r=0/; ISIS Destroys Mosul Museum Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000003537753/isis-
destroys-mosul-museum-artifacts.html (featuring a YouTube video uploaded 
by ISIS).  
52  Rose Troup Buchanan & Heather Saul, ISIS Burns Thousands of 




53  Kristin Romey, Why ISIS Hates Archaeology and Blew Up Ancient 
Iraqi Palace, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 14, 2015), http://news.national 
geographic.com/2015/04/150414-why-islamic-state-destroyed-assyrian-
palace-nimrud-iraq-video-isis-isil-archaeology/; see also Nour Malas, Jihadists 
in Iraq Erase Cultural Heritage, WALL STREET J. (July 25, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/jihadists-in-iraq-erase-cultural-heritage-
1406313661; Marcia Biggs & Gwen Ifill, How War Has Robbed Syria of its 
History, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 19, 2015, 6:35 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/war-robbed-syria-history/. 
54  Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, Address on the Occasion 
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Iconoclasm is an extremely complex phenomenon that has 
occurred in a variety of contexts—primarily in Europe—and 
cannot be reduced into a simplistic and stereotypical reading.55 
Most noteworthy, iconoclasm is associated with the creation of a 
modern State,56 as well as with an imaginary fight against 
luxury. 57  As David Freedberg explains, it is a phenomenon 
expressing “the resentment of the populace, especially in times 
of economic stress, against the expense represented by the 
images.”58 Even in the Byzantine Empire where it served as the 
Emperors’ official doctrine for more than a century,59 iconoclasm 
was entirely dissociated from religions: while the Emperors and 
Popes destroyed a huge amount of books and cultural 
treasures, 60  a number of clergymen and monks continued 
practicing iconography.61 And yet, extremists still maintain the 
                                                
55  See David Freedberg, The Structure of Byzantine and European 
Iconoclasm, in MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 165–67; DARIO GAMBONI, 
THE DESTRUCTION OF ART: ICONOCLASM AND VANDALISM SINCE THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 22–24 (1997) (exploring the typologies of vandalism). 
56  See JAMES NOYES, THE POLITICS OF ICONOCLASM: RELIGION, VIOLENCE 
AND THE CULTURE OF IMAGE-BREAKING IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 1–3 (2013). 
According to Noyes, the history of iconoclasm is “a formative feature of both 
Christian and the Islamic history, crossing the boundaries of religion, culture 
and politics,” and that goes “hand in hand with the political construction of the 
modern State.” Id. at 1; see also Adrian A. Bantjes, The War Against Idols: The 
Meanings of Iconoclasm in Revolutionary Mexico, 1910–40, in NEGATING THE 
IMAGE: CASE STUDIES ON ICONOCLASM 43 (Anne McClanan & Jeff Johnson eds., 
2005) (arguing that organized iconoclasms were primarily related to anti-
clericals, with roots in the 20th century struggle between the liberal state and 
a powerful roman Catholic church). 
57  GAMBONI, supra note 55, at 28 (noting that it has been “object[ing] to 
the use of images as cult objects as well as to related circumstances, such as 
the wealth and power that their production and exploitation bestowed on the 
Church”); David Freedberg, “Iconoclasm and Idolatry,” in A COMPANION TO 
AESTHETICS 207 (David E. Cooper ed., 1995) (highlighting that in practice “the 
motives are much less clear and much more difficult to unravel”).  
58  Freedberg, supra note 57, at 620. 
59  See Anne McClanan & Jeff Johnson, Introduction: ‘O For a Muse of 
Fire’ in, NEGATING THE IMAGE: CASE STUDIES ON ICONOCLASM, supra note 56, at 
1 (explaining that iconoclasm expanded throughout the Christendom); 
GAMBONI, supra note 55, 28–29, (giving examples from the New World carried 
out by the church, especially against the “pagan” indigenous peoples, and that 
the Pope had asked for forgiveness from the Mayan communities for the 
Merida’s Cathedral in Yucatan being built upon the ruins of a Mayan temple). 
60  See CYRIL MANGO, THE ART OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 312–1453: 
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS (1972).  
61  Carlo Bertelli, Pour une évaluation Positive de la Crise Iconoclaste 
Byzantine, 80 REVUE DE L’ART 9, 13 (1988). Ann Epstein however, speculates 
that after iconoclasm the emphasis was placed on the narrative rather than 
the figurative, to avoid offensive representations. See ANN WHARTON EPSTEIN, 
TOKALI KILISE: TENTH-CENTURY METROPOLITAN ART IN BYZANTINE CAPPADOCIA 
48 (1986).  
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argument that pagan cultural heritage should be destroyed 
because of its association to either infidelity or idolatry. Hence, 
while being interviewed about the destruction of the Buddhas of 
the Bamiyan, the Taliban chief Mufti Abd-ul-‘Alim referring to 
the Myth of the golden calf opined that “the statues should be 
destroyed, since there was always a danger of people going back 
to idol-worship.”62 Akin to the Taliban, ISIS also justified its 
acts by reference to the Prophet’s and his companions’ attitude 
towards idols.63 
 In international law it is quite clear that international 
responsibility should arise in all cases where states either allow 
or encourage iconoclastic attacks. In fact, these attacks are not 
only breaching international standards, but, they go against the 
spirit of the United Nations, and especially UNESCO whose 
purpose, is, let us not forget, the building of peace among 
nations through cultural collaboration. 64  Specifically the 
element of intention, which is one that has been put forward in 
the UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional 
Destruction of Cultural Heritage (drafted in the aftermath of 
the Bamiyan bombing) implies that what is most atrocious is 
the will to inflict harm on humanity as a whole.65 In fact, acts of 
this nature are antithetical even to the idea of the notion of 
“heritage,” i.e. the underlying concept of the construction of the 
whole system of cultural heritage protection. As such, they are 
at odds with all UNESCO documents and declarations that 
affirm the significance of cultural heritage and the need to 
eradicate terrorism—the UNESCO 2001 Universal Declaration 
on Cultural Diversity for instance, proclaims that “cultural 
diversity . . . is the common heritage of humanity and should be 
recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future 
generations,” 66  and the UNESCO Call for International 
Cooperation to Prevent and Eradicate Acts of Terrorism states 
                                                
62  See J.M. Butt, The Buddhas Of Bamiyan: Saving Other Possible 
Cultural Targets, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 53; supra note 18 
and accompanying text; infra notes 77, 158 and accompanying text. 
63  See ISIS Destroys Mosul Museum Artifacts, supra note 51, at 00:06–
00:15. 
64  See United Nations Educ. Scien. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO] 
Constitution, art. 1 (“The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace 
and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, 
science and culture . . . .”).  
65  See United Nations Educ. Scien. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO] Records 
of the General Conference: Paris, 29 September to 17 October 2003, § 33 (Oct. 
17, 2003).  
66  United Nations Educ. Scien. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Records of 
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that “acts of terrorism can never be justified whatever the 
motives.” 67  These acts of extremism therefore may trigger 
international responsibility not only under the UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention, 68  but also under international 
humanitarian law. The United Nations Security Council in 
particular has pointed to this direction, “[c]ondemn[ing] the   
destruction   of   cultural   heritage   in   Iraq   and   Syria 
particularly by ISIL and  ANF,  whether  such  destruction  is  
incidental  or  deliberate . . . .”69  
The same findings were provided by the Doha Symposium on 
cultural heritage in 2001, an international conference presided 
by the Emir of the State of Qatar, aiming at  “convey[ing] the 
viewpoint of Islam regarding the preservation of the cultural 
heritage” and further, “saving possible cultural targets” from 
the Taliban.70 The Symposium was attended not only by the 
then Director General of UNESCO Koïchiro Matsuura, but also 
by representatives of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (“ISESCO”) and of the Arab League 
Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (“ALESCO”), 
as well as by members of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (“OIC”), an organization of fifty-seven member 
states based in Saudi Arabia.  
 
III. DOES SHARIA PROHIBIT THE ARTS? 
 
 This said, in classical Islamic law, there has been a lot of 
controversy over the meaning and scope of artistic freedom. 
Muslim leaders have equally condemned terrorist organizations’ 
iconoclastic policies,71  while others have pointed to parts of 
Islamic law that could be read as prohibiting attacks to icons 
and cultural treasures.72 Sharia as a whole, however, is rather 
                                                
67  United Nations Educ. Scien. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Records of 
the General Conference: Paris, 15 September to 17 October 2003, § 39 (Oct. 20, 
2001). 
68  On the discussion on international responsibility for these acts as 
internationally wrongful acts under the UNESCO mechanisms, see Francioni 
& Lenzerini, supra note 34, at 628–38; see also Raymond Goy, La Destruction 
Intentionnelle du Patrimoine Culturel en droit International, 109 REVUE 
GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 273 (2005).  
69  S.C. Res. 2199,  ¶ 15 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
70  DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 6. 
71  See Arab League: ISIS Destruction of Iraqi Heritage ‘Odious Crime’, 
AL ARABIYA NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015) http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-
east/2015/02/27/Arab-League-ISIS-destruction-of-Iraqi-heritage-odious-crime-
.html; OIC Condemns Destruction of Artifacts at Mosul Museum, ARABSTODAY 
(Mar. 2, 2015) http://en.arabstoday.net/culture/also-in-the-news/oic-condemns-
destruction-of-artifacts-at-mosul-museum.html. 
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hostile towards figurative representations. It seems in fact that 
artistic freedom in Islam has been oscillating between two 
fervently opposing situations: stringent religious restrictions on 
the one hand, and an extremely rich artistic tradition on the 
other.  
 
A. Shirk and Prohibitions of Figurative Representations 
  
 The Qur'an does not contain any ban of the arts or of 
figurative representation.73 Yet, a general prohibition of all arts 
is commonly presumed from the aniconic nature of Islam.74 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that it fervently 
prohibits any expressions of polytheism (shirk). Shirk is 
deduced from the first pillar of Islam, the shahada (and the 
belief in Oneness, the tawhid) as well as from Quranic verses75 
and the hadith tradition (i.e. the Prophet’s deeds and sayings).76 
Indeed, a primary concern of the Prophet and his immediate 
successors was to spread the word of Allah. This, however, 
involved fighting against “infidels,” the aim of which was to 
erase all traces of paganism. Shirk, from the perspective of 
idolatry, was considered a serious offence and punished by 
stoning at least until 400/1000. 77  The second reason is the 
virtually sacred meaning that letters hold in Islam. When the 
Angel Gabriel, the Prophet’s messenger, first appeared to the 
                                                                                                         
Dissuade The Taliban From The Destruction Of Figurative Historical 
Remains, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS supra note 34, at 68–70.  
73  See generally ISLAMIC ART AND VISUAL CULTURE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
SOURCES 1–6 (D. Fairchild Ruggles ed., 2011) (referring however, to 
descriptions of paradise as being relevant). 
74  SILVIA NAEF, L’ISLAM EN DÉBATS: Y A-T-IL UNE « QUESTION D’IMAGE » EN 
ISLAM?, 15 (2004); see also Rachel Saloom, You Dropped a Bomb on me, 
Denmark—A Legal Examination of the Cartoon Controversy and Response as it 
Relates to the Prophet Muhammad and Islamic Law, 8 RUTGERS J.L.  & 
RELIGION 1, 5 (2006). 
75    See e.g. Qur’an Su ̄rah II: Al-Baqarah 2:51–54 (reiterating the 
Abrahamic myth of the Golden Calf and prohibit worshipping except Allah); 
Qur’an Su ̄ra IV: Al-Ma'idah, 5:90 (prohibiting sacrifice on stone alters); see 
also NOYES, supra note 56, at 3 (according to whom ‘the greatest threat to 
tawhid is shirk’). 
76  See Muhammad Al-Atawneh, Leisure and Entertainment (malahi) in 
Contemporary Islamic Legal Thought: Music and the Audio-Visual Media, 19 
ISLAMIC L. & SOC'Y 397, 407 (2012) (discussing visual media as shirk); Taha 
Jaber al-Alwani, Fatwa Concerning the United States Supreme Courtroom 
Frieze, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 4 (2001) (discussing painting as shirk); Sheikh 
Bashir Ghalounji, Islam and the Preservation of Human Heritage, in DOHA 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34 at 57; Abdul Hamid Al-Ansari, Islam And The 
Preservation Of The Human Heritage, in id. at 27. 
77  See LORENZ LANGER, RELIGIOUS OFFENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS 325 (2014). 
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Prophet, he commanded Him to “read.” The Qur’an itself stems 
from the Arabic root “read” and “everything, [it] holds, has been 
written from all eternity on al-lawh al-mahfuz, the Well-
Preserved Table, by means of the pre-existent pen.”78 Mosques 
are covered not with drawings, but with meticulous calligraphy 
and it is even said that the Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali, was the 
first calligrapher.79 It is precisely for this reason that literature 
and poetry (rather than painting and sculpture) have held a 
predominant role in the Islamic tradition and that well-known 
Persian poets such as Sanai Ghaznavi (555/1160), Khaqani 
(595/1199) and Rumi (603/1207) are cherished in the Arab-
Islamic world,80 up to the present day. Some of the world’s most 
beautiful poems are Rumi’s.  
The prohibition of visual arts is in addition assumed 
from the sunna and the hadith tradition. The hadith tradition is 
of course a debated topic in Islam, as ahadith may not always be 
authentic,81and, even when authentic, its interpretations are 
frequently questioned—primarily within Islam and among 
Sunni and Shia Muslims.82 In a general sense, however, Muslim 
scholars have held a rigid position not only towards blasphemy 
and apostasy, but also idolatry and anything that resembles it. 
Their works have been misused and translated in many 
instances to justify wholesale bans on the arts.  
Hence, some authors argue that the hadith’s prohibition 
on images are meant to prohibit all images,83 while others argue 
                                                
78  Annemarie Schimmel, from Calligraphy and Islamic Culture, reprinted 
in RELIGION, ART AND VISUAL CULTURE (S. Brent Plate ed., 2002). See generally 
SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, ISLAMIC ART AND SPIRITUALITY 17 (1987).   
79  ANTHONY WELCH & STUART CARY WELCH, ARTS OF THE ISLAMIC BOOK: 
THE COLLECTION OF PRINCE SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN 19 (1982); Nasr, supra note 
78, at 17 & n.14; see also Stephen Vernoit, The Visual Arts in Nineteenth-
Century Muslim Thought, in ISLAMIC ART IN THE 19TH CENTURY: TRADITION, 
INNOVATION, AND ECLECTICISM 19 (Doris Behrens-Abouseif & Stephen Vernoit 
eds., 2006).  
80  See generally Hossein Nasr, supra note 78, at 114–32; see also 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE DIVINE IN ARABIC POETRY (Gert Borg & Ed de Moor 
eds., 2001). 
81  See IBN AL-SALAH AL-SHAHRAZURI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE 
OF THE HADITH 5–23, 25 (2006) (referring to the non-reliable hadith, e.g. the 
weak, interrupted, loose, anomalous, isolated, defective and the 
misrepresented). 
82  See MOHHAMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 87 (3rd ed., 2003) (explaining that “[t]here is no dispute about 
the occurrence of extensive forgery in the hadith literature,”); id. at 92 (on the 
classification and value of the hadith); see also, al-Shahrazuri, supra note 81, 
at 8 (noting that Bukhari “was the first to compose a collection containing only 
sound hadiths” and that therefore “[t]he books of Bukhari and Muslim are the 
soundest”). 
83  See Jaber al-Alwani, supra note 76, at 19. 
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that the Prophet appreciates things that are useful rather than 
those that are merely decorative and might obstruct prayer.84 In 
a very elaborate fatwa concerning the legitimacy of the 
portrayal of the Prophet on the frieze of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Jaberal-Alwani points to at least thirteen narrations of 
ahadith that “regulate” figurative representations. 85  He 
classifies them into separate categories, including those that 
“serve as a warning to the arrogant and vain who try to emulate 
the creation of God by showing off their own skills”86 and those 
that “warn of the necessity of putting aside all that may distract 
people from the worship of the Creator.”87 In one of the most 
well known ahadith, the Prophet, like Plato in his Republic,88 
allegedly cursed image-makers in their attempts to imitate 
God’s act of creation, since “it is only God who has the power 
either to create life, or to take it.”89 In a second narration, 
A’ishah tore off cloths that were hanging on the wall and made 
cushions from it so that Angels may enter her house and the 
Prophet finds no mistake in it.90 And in a third one, the Prophet 
became angry at his wife, A’ishah, because she was found 
wearing a piece of cloth with a picture on it. It narrated:  
 
The Prophet entered upon me while there was a 
curtain having pictures (of animals) in the house. 
His face got red with anger, and then he got hold of 
the curtain and tore it into pieces. The Prophet 
said, “Such people as paint these pictures will 
receive the severest punishment on the Day of 
Resurrection.”91  
                                                
84  Id.; see also, 1 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, BOOK 8, NO. 371 (narrated by 
An’as). 
85  Jaber al-Alwani, supra note 76, at 19. On the hadith tradition and 
artistic representations, see generally, JAMAL ELIAS, AISHA’S CUSHION: 
RELIGIOUS ART, PERCEPTION, AND PRACTICE IN ISLAM 10 (2012). 
86  Jaber al-Alwani, supra note 76, at 21. 
87  Id. 
88  See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 596, 597 (Socrates tries to convince Glavkon 
that God is the only creator; contrary to the “artisans” and others who “make” 
things, artists are mere “second-hand” imitators of that creation. They would 
therefore not deserve a position in Plato’s fictitious Republic).  
89  3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, BOOK 34, NO. 299 (narrated by Aun bin Abu 
Juhaifa); see also, GÖRAN LARSSON, MUSLIMS AND THE NEW MEDIA: HISTORICAL 
AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 52–53 & nn.24–28 (2011) and Al-Atawneh, supra 
note 76, at 407 (referring to the views of Shaykh Ahmad al-Kutty); RICHARD 
ETTINGHAUSEN, ARAB PAINTING 13 (1977) (suggesting that “the artist, in 
making something lifelike, is thought to compete blasphemously with God”).   
90  Jaber al-Alwani, supra note 76, at 15 n.37, citing 7 SAHIH MUSLIM, 
BOOK 86 (narrated by Muslim bi Sharh al-Nawawi).  
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Similarly, it is narrated that when the Prophet was ill, 
his wives came to see him and told him about paintings they 
had seen in a church in Abyssinia (present day Ethiopia); when 
they told the Prophet about it, however, he admonished them 
rather than sharing their enthusiasm, stating, “if any religious 
man dies amongst those people they would build a place of 
worship at his grave and make these pictures in it. They will be 
the worst creature in the sight of Allah on the Day of 
Resurrection.”92 Indeed, it does not appear that the Prophet was 
particularly enthusiastic about painting. In fact, so strong was 
his disapproval of anything that could be perceived as shirk93 
that when he conquered Mecca (8/630AD) he smashed not only 
idols but also icons in the Kaaba, the holy Islamic shrine. Only 
one image (presumably of the Holy Virgin enlacing Jesus) was 
spared: it is said that the Prophet “[held] his hands over it for 
protection while the others were effaced.”94   
Just like figurative representation, Quranic verses and 
ahadith have been used to justify absolute prohibitions of music 
other than Quranic recitation.95 In fact, the permissibility of 
music is another “age-old dispute amongst Muslim jurists.”96 
Many conservative Saudi scholars,97 as well as Salafists and 
adepts of Wahhabism,98 have been claiming for a long time that 
                                                                                                         
SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, BOOK 43, NO. 659 (narrated by Al-Qasim); see also ELIAS, 
supra note 85, 9–11. 
92  1 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, BOOK 8, NO 419 (narrated by Aysha); 2 SAHIH 
AL-BUKHARI, Book 23, No 425 (narrated by Aysha); see also Modj-ta-ba Sadria, 
Figural Representation in Islamic Art, 20 MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 63, 99 (1984). 
93  See supra notes 74–77. 
94  Sadria, supra note 92, at 99; NOYES, supra note 56, at 73 (referring 
however to a picture of Jesus in Kabbala); see also, Anis Ahmad, Islam and 
Cultural Heritage, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34; Abd-Ur-Razzak 
Guessoum, Islam And World Heritage, in id. at 50, 60. 
95  See Lois Ibsen al Faruqi, The Cantillation of the Qu’ran, 19 ASIAN 
MUSIC 1 (1987); VOICES OF ISLAM 59–62 (Vincent Cornell ed., 2007); Farid El 
Asri, L’expression musicale de musulmans européens. Création de sonorités et 
normativité religieuse, 25 REVUE EUROPÉENNE DES MIGRATIONS 
INTERNATIONALES 35–50 (2009). On the topic of sacred music and dervish 
dancing in Sufism, see SUFISM, MUSIC AND SOCIETY: IN TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE 
EAST 30–33 (Anders Hammarlund et al. eds.,1997) (pointing also however to 
the banning of these traditions for a long period of time); see also, Lois Ibsen al 
Faruqi, Music, Musicians and Muslim Law, 17 ASIAN MUSIC 3–36 (1985) (on 
the imposition of rhythms outside the text that is being recited). 
96  See Al-Atawneh, supra note 76, at 398. 
97 Jaber al-Alwani, supra note 76, at 12–13; see also Al-Atawneh, supra 
note 76, at 407 (referring to the views of Shaykh Ahmad al-Kutty and Shaykh 
'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Biz).  
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any sort of music (including instrumental) should be 
prohibited.99 Hence, Muslim jurists and ulemas at times have 
deduced that singing and the “beating of Tambur (drum)” are 
unlawful under Sharia.100 They have in some instances also 
deduced that the playing of musical instruments is forbidden. 
This has been deduced from ahadith such as this:  
 
that he heard the Prophet saying: “from among my 
followers there will be some people who will 
consider . . . the use of musical instruments, as 
lawful . . . Allah will destroy them during the night 
and will let the mountain fall on them, and He will 
transform the rest of them into monkeys and pigs 
and they will remain so till the Day of 
Resurrection.”101  
 
In another hadith the drum seems to be allowed during the 
celebration of Eid:  
 
that during the Mina days, Abu Bakr came to her, 
while there where two girls with her, beating 
drums, and the Prophet was (lying) covering 
himself with his garment. Abu Bakr rebuked the 
two girls, but the Prophet uncovered his face and 
said 'O Abu Bakr! Leave them, for these are the 
days of Id (i.e. festival) . . . .102   
 
Of course most of these ahadith have been considered by 
Muslim scholars as non-authentic, 103  while Al-Ghazali in 
particular asserts that there are no authentic traditions 
                                                
99  See A. J. WENSINCK, A HANDBOOK OF EARLY MUHAMMADAN TRADITION 
173 (1927); SHEILA R. CANBY, ISLAMIC ART IN DETAIL 32 (2005); 2 GROVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC ART AND ARCHITECTURE, 182–83 (Jonathan Bloom & 
Sheila S. Blair eds., 2009) 
100  See Qur’an Surah Al-Jumu`ah (The Congregation, Friday) 62:11 
(Muhammad Muhsin Khan, trans.) (“they disperse headlong to it, and leave 
you (Muhammad [SAW]) standing [while delivering Jumu'ah's religious talk 
(Khutbah)]. Say ‘That which Allah has is better than any amusement or 
merchandise! And Allah is the Best of providers’”); Surat Luqman (Luqman), 
31:6 (“And of mankind is he who purchases idle talks (i.e. music, singing, etc.) 
to mislead (men) from the Path of Allah without knowledge, and takes it (the 
Path of Allah, or the Verses of the Qu’ran) by way of mockery. For such there 
will be a humiliating torment (in the Hell-fire)). 
101  7 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, BOOK 69, NO. 494 (narrated by Abu 'Amir or Abu 
Malik Al-Ash'ari).  
102  4 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, BOOK 56, NO. 730 (Narrated by 'Aisha). 
103  Al-Atawneh, supra note 76, at 401–02. On the non-authentic, see 
supra note 60. 
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“specifically banning music,” but rather that “music was 
practiced during the lifetime of the Prophet.”104   
 
 
B. Artistic Traditions Flourishing in the Muslim World  
 
Arts flourished astonishingly during the whole expansion 
period of Islam. This happened largely thanks to the Great 
Caliphs—the Ummayad and the Abbasids in the 8th and 9th 
century, but also the Safavids in Persia (15th century) and the 
Mughals in India (16th century)—who supported financially 
culture and writing.105 
i. Painting and Iconography  
During the centuries of warfare in the early rise of Islam, 
“Muslims conquered lands previously unknown to them and 
Islam was introduced to peoples such as the Persians, Turks, 
Armenians, Indians, Kurds and Abyssinians.”106 Literature from 
antiquity was restored, science expanded, and, new treatises 
were written, including on the use of papers and colours107 and 
on aesthetics. 108  All arts of the Book flourished, not only 
calligraphy and illumination, but also, illustration and painting. 
The artistic treasures and knowledge of course in most cases 
remained the privilege of the royal and sub-royal families.109 
Thus, artists at the time of the Prophet and under these 
dynasties seem to have enjoyed admirable freedom. 110 
Iconographers represented visually a variety of topics—not only 
                                                
104  Al-Atawneh, supra note 76, at 402; see also ISLAMIC ART AND VISUAL 
CULTURE , supra note 73, at 34–35 (referring to Ghazali’s writings on the art of 
the pen and the functions of Secretaries, citing the Arabic version of Ghazali’s 
Al-tabr al-masbuk fi nasihat al-muluk wa al-wuzara wa al-wulat and 
Ghazali’s Book of Councel for Kings, 1964).  
105  See generally WELCH & WELCH, supra note 79, at 139. 
106  Ghalounji, supra note 76, at 59. 
107  Id. at 38–39, 50–51 (referring to Nishapuri’s (1442/1519) treatise on 
“Papers, Color and Ink” (1433) and to Sadiqi Beg’s (1533/1609) Qanun Al-
Suvar treatise on “Painting”). 
108  Id. at 74–75 (referring to Ibn Hazm’s (994/1064) and Ibn al-
Haytham’s (965/1039) treatise “On Vision”). 
109  One of the most tragic events in Islamic art history is considered to be 
the destruction of the Fatimid library in the 11th century. Ernst J. Grube, 
Fostat Fragments, in ISLAMIC PAINTING AND THE ARTS OF THE BOOK 25 (B.W. 
Robinson et al. eds., 1976). 
110  See ISLAMIC ART AND VISUAL CULTURE, supra note 73, at 11–31; 
MILSTEIN ET AL., STORIES OF THE PROPHETS: ILLUSTRATED MANUSCRIPTS OF 
QISẠS ̣AL-ANBIYA 27–28 (1999) (discussing artistic freedom in the 
representation of Prophets in paintings).  
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common ones (such as battles, forests or kings), but also 
sensitive ones, such as lovers.111  Even depictions of sodomy 
between males are found in manuscripts dating from the period 
of the Abbasids.112 In many instances, religious scenes were 
illustrated. The most impressive such work is arguably the the 
Fa ̄l-nama ̄, the 16th century Persian book on Prophesies (the 
“Book of Omens”),113 and also, the so-called Qisas an anbiya, 
whose initial texts date from 732AD. 114  The Prophet also 
appears in these manuscripts;115 and like other prophets that 
appear in Islamic iconography, he is usually surrounded by a 
circular flame halo. Contrary to other prophets, however, whose 
faces are visible in depictions,116 his face is likely to be blurred 
or covered by a veil.117 In some cases, the Prophet’s entire head, 
or his body, is covered by a flamed halo,118  while in other 
manuscripts dating from the 18th and 19th century he is 
represented by a flame.119  
                                                
111  See Robinson, supra note 109, at 266 (showing Lovers in a pavilion, 
Mashaad c. 1570). 
112  See Stephen O. Murray, The Will Not to Know, in STEPHEN O. MURRAY 
& WILL ROSCOE, ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES: CULTURE, HISTORY AND LITERATURE 
17–18 (1997); see also Javaid Rehman & Eleni Polymenopoulou, Is Green a 
Part of the Rainbow? Sharia, Homosexuality and LGBT Rights in the Muslim 
World, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 29 n.107 (2013). 
113  See MILSTEIN ET AL., supra note 110, at 66–69; Eva R. Hoffman, The 
Beginnings of the Illustrated Arabic Book: An Intersection Between Art and 
Scholarship, 17 MUQARNAS 37–52 (2000).  
114  Id. at 1, 7. 
115  See Christiane Gruber, Between Logos (Kalima) And Light (Nu ̄R): 
Representations of the Prophet Muhammad in Islamic Painting, 26 MUQARNAS 
229 (2009); Oleg Grabar & Mika Natif, Histoire des portraits du prophète 
Muḥammad, in DE LA FIGURATION HUMAINE AU PORTRAIT DANS L’ART ISLAMIQUE 
89–110 (Houari Touati ed., 2015); see also MISLTEIN ET AL., supra note 110, at 
160 and relevant illustrations.   
116  E.g., Robinson, supra note 109, at annex illustration III.72 (Moses in 
the Red sea), illustration III.238 (Noah’s ark 1570c). 
117  See, e.g., MILSTEIN ET AL., supra note 110, at MS T-4 (Muhammad 
about to marry Khadija); see also Gruber supra note 76, at 230, 238 (the 
Prophet’s Ascension); Robinson, supra note 109, at 216, illustration 27.IV.15 
(The Prophet and his Companions, Istanbul, early 17th century), annex, 
illustration IV.16 (The Prophet in Paradise–Ottoman early 17th century). 
118  MILSTEIN ET AL., supra note 110, at XXXII MS T-4 (Muhammad 
returning from the Miraj); id. at XXXIII MS T-5 (Soldiers presenting to 
Muhammad the severed heard of Abu Jahl); id. at 9 MS B (Muhammad  on the 
Mi ‘raj); id. at XLII (Muhammad’s prophetic nature recognized by a monk); id 
at 12 MS C (Muhammad praying in the Masjid al-Aqsa); see also Robinson, 
supra note 109, at 168, illustration 19.III.207  (the Miraj – Tabriz 1505), 216, 
illustration 27.IV.15 (the Prophet and his Companions, Istanbul, early 17th 
century), XVII MS N-2 (Ali breaking down the doors). 
119  See, e.g. Muhammad Destroying Idols—L’Histoire Merveilleuse en 
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 Yet, the Islamic tradition of iconography has never been 
an isolated one. On the contrary, it seems that the artistic 
exchange between civilizations was quite significant. In fact, 
during the rule of the Great Caliphs, diplomatic and cultural 
exchanges with nearby realms such as Palestine and Abyssinia 
(where Jewish and Christian monks lived and practiced 
iconography) were frequent,120 facilitating artistic exchanges by 
implication. 121  Archaeological research corroborates these 
arguments. The mural paintings discovered close to Qurayt Al-
Faw in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s demonstrate that larger 
dimension wall-paintings and sculptures were present at the 
time of the Prophet, in a style that presents important 
similarities with the Hellenistic tradition.122 Even the mosaics 
discovered in the Medina mosque “were most likely made by 
Christian artisans who had gained their skill working on the 
many mosaic programs adoring Byzantine churches in the 
eastern Mediterranean.” 123  The discovery of the murals in 
Qusayr Amrah in Jordan,124 and those in Qasr al-Hayr al-Ghari 
in Syria,125 are in this respect even more significant, given that 
                                                                                                         
ahomet_BNF.jpg (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (Persian version where Ali is also 
represented as a flame); Illustration, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Depictions_of_Muhammad#/media/File:Banu_Qurayza.png (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
120  E.g. Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 
A.J.I.L. 609, 613 (1980) (referring to diplomatic exchanges with Abyssinia). 
121  See ETTINGHAUSEN, supra note 89, at 67 (1977) (discussing “Byzantine 
Art in Islamic Garb”); 1 LUCY-ANNE HUNT, BYZANTIUM, EASTERN CHRISTENDOM 
AND ISLAM: ART AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN 205 
(1998) (essay Christian Muslim Relations in Painting in Egypt of the Twelfth 
to Mid-Thirteenth Centuries: Sources of Wallpainting at Deir Es-Suriani and 
the Illustration of the New Testament Ms Paris, Copte-Arabe 1/Cairo, Bibl. 94 
at 205), figures 24–35; Robinson supra note 109, at 69, 69 nn.311–14; ISLAMIC 
ART AND VISUAL CULTURE , supra note 73 at 109–12 (on the reception of 
Byzantine ambassadors in Baghdad, referring to Ghada al-Hijjawi al-
Qaddumi’s Book of Gifts and Rarities published by CUP 1996 and Kitab al-
hadaya wa al-tuhaf, published by Kuwait Government Press 1959). 
122  See ABDUL RAHMAN AL-ANSARY, QARYAT AL-FAW: A PORTRAIT OF PRE-
ISLAMIC CIVILISATION IN SAUDI ARABIA (1982), at 128, 
https://archive.org/stream/QaryatAl-fawAPortraitOfPre-
islamicCivilisationInSaudiArabia1982/QaryatAl-faw#page/n61/mode/2up; 
NOYES, supra note 56, at 72. 
123  ISLAMIC ART AND VISUAL CULTURE, supra note 73, at 99. 
124  Quseir Amra, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/327/ (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015) (listing the cite on the World Heritage List); ETTINGHAUSEN, 
supra note 89, at 29.  
125  Un Chateau du désert: Qasr al-Hayr ach-Charqi, UNESCO (WORLD 
HERITAGE TENTATIVE LIST –SYRIA) available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/ 
tentativelists/1298/ (listing the Syrian site on the tentative list); 
ETTINGHAUSEN, supra note 89, at 35–37 (illustration of “Musicians and 
hunting Cavalier,” Damascus, c 730). 
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they were not discovered in nomadic areas, but in the palaces of 
the Ummayad Caliphs. While UNESCO attributes them to the 
fact that the “Ummayad civilization was imbued with a pre-
Islamic secular culture,”126 they could much more significantly 
represent a strong argument against the monolithic 
understanding of the position of Islam vis-à-vis the arts. 
 
 ii. Musical Expressions  
 
 Musical expressions equally flourished in the early years 
of Islam—in the cities of Mecca and the Medina as much as in 
the desert. The tribesmen who lived in the pre-Islamic Arabian 
Peninsula maintained rich oral and musical traditions that 
were transmitted to generations much later after the Prophet’s 
conquests. Some of these musical practices have survived until 
today: the practice of the imzad, for instance, common among 
Touareg women,127 or the Al-Zajal, a form of musical poetry 
common in the Middle East that has been “passed down from 
generation to generation through observation, imitation and 
participation.”128 Both of these practices were listed as part of 
UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2013 and 2014 
respectively: the first on behalf of Lebanon and the second on 
behalf of Algeria, Mali, and Niger. On the other hand, musical 
performance was part of life in the city under the rule of the 
great Caliphs.129 This was the case not only when “drummers 
and trumpeters accompanied armies into battle,”130 but also 
during gatherings and other forms of entertainment. In the 
tenth and eleventh centuries, the lyrics of popular songs were 
collected in a book called the Kitab al Aghani (the Book of 
                                                
126  UNESCO, supra note 124.  
127  See United Nations Educ. Scien. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], 
Nomination File 00891 for Inscription in 2013 on the Representative List of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity at 3 (Dec. 2013),www.unesco. 
org/culture/ich/doc/download.php?versionID=20738. 
128  See United Nations Educ. Scien. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], 
Nomination File 01000 for Inscription in 2013 on the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage of Humanity in 2014, at 4–5 (Nov. 2014), www.unesco.org/culture/ 
ich/doc/download.php?versionID=30515. 
129  Newsletter No. 75, (OIC Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and 
Culture), Jan. 2008–April 2008, at 40–41 (), http://www.ircica.org/ 
content_images/NL%2075.pdf (featuring a book review of Mawsû’at 
Makkah al-Mukarramah wa’al-Madinah al-Munawwarah); see also Sadria, 
supra note 92, at 99. 
130  SPIRIT OF LIFE: MASTERPIECES OF ISLAMIC ART FROM THE AGA KHAN 
MUSEUM COLLECTION 163 (2007); see also REPRESENTATIONS OF THE DIVINE IN 
ARABIC POETRY, supra note 80, at 1 (noting that the expansion period of Islam 
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Songs), 131  while “medieval metalwork from Mosul and 
Damascus decorated with vignettes from the courtly cycle 
regularly includes musicians alongside hunters and drinkers.”132 
Manuscripts also corroborate this evidence. By way of 
illustration, a manuscript from late sixteenth century Iran 
depicts a young man playing the tar;133 an illustration from 
Lahore from 1595 depicts musical entertainment at a scholar’s 
house; 134  and a manuscript from Munghal, India depicts a 
kemenche player,135 still played in many parts of the Arab world.  
 
IV. LIMITS TO ARTISTIC FREEDOM: THE OFFENCES OF 
BLASPHEMY AND APOSTASY 
Despite the rich artistic tradition of the Muslim world 
and its openness to cultural exchange, a strict interpretation of 
Islam only tolerates, rather than encourages, the arts. Even in 
what is tolerated, however, serious limitations may potentially 
apply.  
A. Blasphemy in Classical Islam  
In classical Islam, blasphemy is one of the most 
important limitations. In classical Islam, there is no agreement 
as to its exact meaning and punishment. Most authors agree 
that an equivalent of the word “blasphemy” is not mentioned in 
the Qur’an.136 Rabb mentions that Abu Hanafi, i.e. the leader of 
the most popular School of thought in Sunni Islam, viewed 
blasphemy as the refutation of the oneness of God,137 and by 
implication also of the first pillar of Islam, the shahada. For 
Saeed and Hashemi, on the other hand, blasphemy seems to be 
equivalent to an offense called “sabb,”138 which generally means 
                                                
131  REPRESENTATIONS OF THE DIVINE IN ARABIC POETRY, supra note 80, at 
86; see also ETTINGHAUSEN, supra note 89, at 64–65. 
132  REPRESENTATIONS OF THE DIVINE IN ARABIC POETRY, supra note 80, at 
86.  
133  See SPIRIT OF LIFE, supra note 130, at 166.  
134  See id. at 167. 
135  See id. at 169. 
136  Intisar A. Rabb, Negotiating Speech in Islamic Law and Politics: 
Flipped Traditions of Expression, in ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 146 (Anver Emon et al. eds., 2012); KAMRAN HASHEMI, RELIGIOUS 
LEGAL TRADITIONS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND MUSLIM STATES 31 
(2008); see also ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: 
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI’A 121 (2008); ABDULLAH SAEED & HASSAN 
SAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY AND ISLAM 37–38 (2004).  
137  Rabb, supra note 136, at 158–59. 
138  SAEED & SAEED, supra note 136, at 37–38; Abdullahi, Cultural 
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to express “despicable and irreverent speech” 139  or more 
generally, to “insult.” 140  Sabb was initially conceived as an 
offense against God (sabb-Allah) or the Prophet (sabb-al-
Rasoul)—but later on, also against the Messengers of God (i.e. 
the Angels) and the companions of the Prophet.141  As for the 
exact legal consequences of sabb, views differ. Hashemi suggests 
that during the lifetime of the Prophet, its punishment was an 
act of warfare applicable to enemy warriors, and that the 
Prophet himself and his immediate successors were rather 
tolerant towards divergent opinions expressed in public—
provided only that such speech did not defame the Caliphs.142 
He also asserts that for a long time the Muslim jurists of the 
leading Sunni schools did not hold anyone criminally 
accountable for blasphemy, not even those acting intentionally, 
“unless if they constituted explicit denials of faith,” or if they 
“acted out of some honest but erroneous interpretation of law of 
theology.”143 Wiederhold, on the contrary, argues that in the 
early years of Islam, “all canonical Hadith collections contain 
traditions suggesting that the vilification of the Prophet and his 
Companions was considered intolerable and therefore forbidden 
by some of the religious scholars.”144 He also observed, “[t]he 
assumption that blasphemy against the Prophet was regarded 
an intolerable act in the second/eighth century finds 
corroboration in a legal source—the Muwatta' of ‘Abdallah b. 
Wahb (d. 197/812).”145 He further notes that “the discussion of 
the views on blasphemy as developed by scholars who adhere to 
various madhhabs [i.e. schools of thought] suggests that there 
                                                                                                         
Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTHERN VOICES 79 (Francis 
Deng et al. eds., 2009); HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 31–33 (citing Saeed); Lutz 
Wiederhold, Blasphemy Against the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions 
(Sabb Al-Rasul, Sabb Al-Sahabah), 42 J. SEMITIC STUD. 39, 41 (1997). 
139  See Report by the Venice Commission: The Relationship Between 
Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: The Issue of Regulation and 
Prosecution of Blasphemy, Insult and Incitement to Religious Hatred, in 
BLASHPHEMY, INSULT AND HATRED: FINDING ANSWERS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
¶¶ 23–24 (2010). 
140 HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 31; see also Wiederhold, supra note 138, 
at 40. 
141  See HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 36 (citing Qur’an Su ̄ra II: Al-Baqara 
(the Cow) 2:256; Su ̄ra III: 'Āli `Imran (Family of Imran) 3:72, 3:90; Su ̄ra II: 
An-Nisa IV 4:48, 4:137; Surat V: Al-Mā'idah (The Table Spread) 5:54). 
142  HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 31–32. According to Hashemi, the most 
famous case is Ka’b ben al-Ashraf, who composed poetry that insulted the 
Prophet and his companions and later died in the battlefield. Id.  
143  Id. at 31–32. 
144  Wiederhold, supra note 138, at 41. 
145  Id. at 43. 
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was no essential ikhtilaf [i.e. disagreement] . . . on the issue of 
sabb” and that “[p]rominent jurists of all four major Sunni 
madhabs [i.e. Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki schools of 
thought] agree that those who abuse the Prophet and his 
Companions must be considered as sinners or unbelievers 
respectively.”146 
 It appears in fact that soon after the Prophet’s death, 
blasphemy and sabb offenses became confused with irtidad or 
ridda (i.e. apostasy).147 Apostasy means to reject Islam and is 
considered to be one of the most serious crimes in Islamic 
criminal law. It is considered the first of seven crimes entailing 
hadd punishment,148 namely, the death penalty.149 In particular, 
it seems that when blasphemy was committed by a Muslim, this 
“was discussed by legal scholars in the context of apostasy 
[riddah] and unbelief [kufr].”150 Hence, although in Islam “insult 
is a matter of relativism” and the “customs [urf] of each society” 
differed, 151  blasphemy in the course of time was gradually 
considered a hudud crime.152 Such association was clearly not 
random, but rather a natural consequence of the extremely 
powerful Islamic condemnation of “disbelief” (kufr).153 Hence, 
while “early Islamic scholars distinguished between a kafir [i.e. 
unbeliever, infidel] and murtadd [i.e. apostate],” the preeminent 
Islamic scholars of the main Sunni schools did not discern 
                                                
146  Id. at 58. 
147  In some cases, procedural guarantees differ; for instance, the Iranian 
Criminal Code provides that hudud offenses are punished by the death 
penalty only after the fourth time. See Rabb, supra note 136, at 146 (arguing 
that “over time, jurists drew on the hadith in times of war to authorize the 
Head of State generally to use his discretion to impose the death penalty on 
one-time Muslims who manifested their disbelief”); Slaughter, supra note 10, 
177–78. Hashemi on the other hand, does not agree that sabb is related to 
apostasy. See HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 37.  
148  See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE SHARIA AND ISLAMIC PUBLIC LAW IN 
TIME OF WAR AND PEACE 123–47 (2014) (There are three types of crimes: hudud 
(plural of hadd), tazir and quisas); ABDUR RAHMAN DOI, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC 
LAW 341–42 (2nd ed., 2008); KAMALI, supra note 82, at 293–94. 
149  See SAEED & SAEED, supra note 136, at 139; Rabb, supra note 136, 
234–38 (discussing pre-modern Islamic legal restrictions on freedom of religion 
with particular reference to apostasy and its punishment); Elizabeth Peiffer, 
The Death Penalty in Traditional Islamic Law and as Interpreted in Saudi 
Arabia and Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507, 511–12 (2005), 
reprinted in 2 ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 546–47 (2012); Slaughter, supra note 
10, 180–81 (referring to several hadiths and the practice of the first Caliph,). 
150  HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 43. 
151  Id. at 32. 
152  SAEED & SAEED, supra note 136, at 28; HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 
36–38; Rabb, supra note 136. 
153  “Kufr” stems from the three-letter Arabic root k-f-r, and is translated 
by most authors as “apostasy” and by fewer authors as “blasphemy.” 
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between the two concepts “since the legal term 'apostasy' 
(irtidad) cannot be understood without referring to the 
theological concept of unbelief.”154 The reason precisely, as noted 
by Rabb, “[t]o curse God or to blaspheme Him . . . was implicitly 
to signal departure from the community of Muslims and the 
laws governing them.”155 Indeed, throughout the Qur’an, the 
word “disbelief” is used numerous times with extremely 
negative connotation. 156  Non-believers, including those who 
“believe and then disbelieve,”157 along with other individuals 
“who take disbelievers as allies instead of the believers,”158 are 
condemned in a number of different verses. Some of these verses 
also provide for severe punishments,159 such as “gather[ing] in 
Hell all together along with the hypocrites.”160 The depictions of 
the Prophet in particular may also give rise to “aggravating 
circumstances,” as the contempt for any Prophet is an 
autonomous offense on its own. Accordingly, some authors 
consider this offense equivalent to hadd, while others qualify it 
as tazir, which is a lighter offense. 161  Limitations that are 
recognized in Sharia scholarship should equally apply—for 
instance, the fact that intentional killings and unnecessary 
                                                
154  Shlomo C. Pill, Law as Faith, Faith as Law: The Legalization of 
Theology in Islam and Judaism in the Thought of Al-Ghazali and 
Maimonides, 6 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 1, 13 (2014). 
155  Rabb, supra note 136, at 158. 
156  See Qu’ran Surat II: Al-Baqarah (the Cow) 2:88 (starting from the 
reiteration of the biblical story of the Golden Calf in “And they say, 'Our 
hearts are wrapped.’ . . . Nay, Allah has cursed them for their disbelief, so 
little is it that they believe.”).  
157  See Qur’an Surat IV: An-Nisā 4:137-140 (“Indeed, those who have 
believed then disbelieved, then believed, then disbelieved, and then increased 
in disbelief—never will Allah forgive them, nor will He guide them to a way. . . 
.”). 
158  Qur’an Surat IV: An-Nisā  4:139. 
159  See Qur’an Su ̄ra III: 'Āli `Imrān (Family of Imran) 3:4 (“He revealed 
the Qur’an. Indeed, those who disbelieve in the verses of Allah will have a 
severe punishment, and Allah is exalted in Might, the Owner of Retribution”); 
Su ̄ra IV: An-Nisā' (The Women) 4:42 (“On that day those who disbelieved and 
disobeyed the Messenger (Muhammad SAW) will wish that they were buried 
in the earth, but they will never be able to hide a single fact from Allah”); id. 
102 (Dr Ghali trans.) (“Indeed, Allah has prepared for the disbelievers a 
humiliating punishment”); Su ̄ra VIII:  Al-'Anfāl (The Spoils of War) 8:7 (“But 
Allah intended to establish the truth by His words and to eliminate the 
disbelievers”); id. at 36 (“And those who have disbelieved - unto Hell they will 
be gathered”); Su ̄ra XXI: Al-'Anbyā' (The Prophets) 21:29-30 (“If those who 
disbelieved but knew the time when they will not avert the Fire from their 
faces or from their backs and they will not be aided . . . . Rather, it will come to 
them unexpectedly and bewilder them, and they will not be able to repel it, 
nor will they be reprieved.”). 
160  Qur’an Su ̄ra IV: An-Nisā' (The Women) 9:140. 
161  Id. at 211. 
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harm to others in times of peace are prohibited.162  
 
B. Blasphemy and “Religious Defamation” in Muslim States 
Practice  
 
There is a general religious obligation in Muslim states 
to not contradict Sharia law. Hence in domestic practice, 
blasphemy offenses may be prosecuted and punished before 
domestic jurisdictions, as long as a state contains a relevant 
crime in its criminal code. In this way, its punishment applies 
equally to non-Muslims. 163  In the extreme case of Islamic 
republics, punishments may be imposed under Sharia law. This 
situation has been of course serving as tool for extreme political 
oppression against dissident opinions.164 Moreover, in many of 
these republics, a priori censorship may be exercised. In Saudi 
Arabia, blasphemy is a criminal offense punishable by death. 
The 2000 Press and Publication Act establishes fines for any 
media criticizing the Council of Senior Religious Scholars.165 
According to Amnesty International, in 2014, “the government 
severely restricted freedoms of expression, association and 
assembly, and cracked down on dissent, arresting and 
imprisoning critics, including human rights defenders.” 166 
Likewise in the United Arab Emirates, at least since the early 
1990s, the “Censorship Department of the Ministry of 
Information and Culture reviews all imported newspapers, 
periodicals, books, films, and videos, and bans items considered 
                                                
162  See BASSIOUNI, supra note 148, at 285; FARHAD MALEKIAN, PRINCIPLES 
OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE SEARCH 117–99 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
163  See MALEKIAN, supra note 162, at 51. 
164  An-Na’im, supra note 29, 23–24; HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 34; 
Rabb, supra note 136, 158–59; Javaid Rehman, The Sharia, Islamic Family 
Laws and International Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and 
Practice of Polygamy and Talaq, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 108 (2007); see also 
Farer, supra note 12, 19–20; ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
TRADITION AND POLITICS  (4th ed., 2012); Jytte Klausen, The Danish Cartoons 
and Modern Iconoclasm in the Cosmopolitan Muslim Diaspora, 8 HARV. 
MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC REV. 86 (2009); see also KLAUSEN, supra note 9, 
19–20 (arguing that “cultural differences can be easily manipulated to advance 
political interests.”). 
165  U.N., Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 15 
(b) of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 and Paragraph 5 of 
the Annex to Council Resolution 16/21: Saudi Arabia,  ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SAU/2 (Aug. 6, 2013). 
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[inter alia] pornographic, violent or derogatory to Islam.”167 Also 
in Pakistan, the criminal code punishes blasphemy by the death 
penalty and insults to the Qur’an by life imprisonment. The law 
is being regularly abused against religious minorities,168 while a 
number of executions have sadly taken place for both apostasy 
and blasphemy. 169  In post-revolutionary Iran, all laws and 
regulations regarding political offenses and offenses of the press 
must be based on “Islamic criteria.”170 The Iranian criminal code 
in addition provides that “whoever insults Islam and its holy 
attributes and his offence amounts to the apostasy should be 
punished as an apostate;”171 a clause that results to artists, 
musicians, and filmmakers such as Jafar Panahi being 
imprisoned, and others, like Sherin Neshat being in exile. Other 
Sharia-compliant states such as Yemen, 172  Oman, 173 
Afghanistan 174  equally provide for extremely detailed 
punishments of all types of insults against Islam. Even in 
Sudan apostasy is still a crime entailing the death penalty and a 
number of human rights activists and journalists are reported 
to be detained incommunicado.175  
This obligation has passed also in supranational 
declarations of rights. It is stated, for instance, in the Universal 
                                                
167  U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., United Arab 
Emirates 2014 Human Rights Report 9 (2014).   
168  See Stephanie E. Berry & Javaid Rehman, Is “Defamation of 
Religions” Passé? The United Nations, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 
and Islamic State Practices: Lessons from Pakistan, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 431, 453–67 (2012); Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and 
Holy Laws,: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—Controversial Origins, Design 
Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 303, 324 (2008). 
169 See Ujala Akram, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion and Islam, 
16 EUR. J.L. REFORM 353, 364, nn.71–73, nn.82–84 (2014); see also Zahra 
Hayat, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 27 (1994–
1995); see also U.N., Human Rights Council, Communications Report of 
Special Procedures, A/HRC/27/72, at 69 (Aug. 20, 2014) (highlighting the 
death of lawyer in Pakistan who worked on blasphemy cases).  
170  ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION] 1368 [1989] art. 168 (Iran).  
171  See HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 58. 
172 See Prohibitions on Publication Law No. 25, art. 103 (1990) (Yemen).  
173   See Omani Penal Code, art. 29 (1974).  
174  See Official Publication of the Government of the Republic of 
Afghanistan. Penal Code, arts. 77 & 144 (1976); see also U.N. H.R.C., Reports 
of the Human Rights Council on its twelfth session, A/HRC/12/50 (Feb. 25, 
2010) ¶ 388 (regarding the concern of International Pen “about the existence of 
‘blasphemy’ laws, under which a number of writers and publishers had been 
charged and imprisoned and sentenced to death.”).  
175  U.N., Human Rights Council, Compilation prepared by the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) 
of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1: Sudan (Feb. 24, 2011) 
39–44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/11/SDN/2; see also An-Na’im, supra, note 29. 
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Islamic Declaration, fruit of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, prepared in Dhaka in 1981 and circulated to 
UNESCO in 1984 that “[e]very person has the right to express 
his thoughts and beliefs so long as he remains within the limits 
prescribed by the Law,”176 i.e. including therefore Sharia law. 
Similarly, according to the so-called “Cairo Declaration” adopted 
by the OIC in 1993, “every man has a right to freely express his 
opinion, provided it does not conflict with the principles of 
Sharia.”177 Most alarmingly, the Muslim States, through the 
OIC, have been pressuring the international community to 
legitimize these controversial obligations at an international 
level for more than ten years.178 The pressure had amounted to 
the widely discussed “defamation of religions” campaign, the 
series of resolutions that were voted alternatively before the 
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations since 1999.179 In 2010, presumably due to the presence 
of the United States within the Human Rights Council, no such 
resolution was voted on, and another was passed instead, fully 
in line with the international standards.180 Indeed, the issue 
seemed buried at least for a while—for instance, in a panel on 
“religious intolerance and discrimination” held in Geneva 
during the twentieth Session of the Human Rights Council in 
July 2012, the issue of defamation of religions was not even 
brought up.181 
                                                
176  Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12. For an 
extensive discussion, see Nicholas Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on 
Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384–
435 (1970); see also MOHAMMED AMIN AL-MIDANI, LES DROITS DE L'HOMME EN 
ISLAM (2003). 
177  U.N., World Conference on Human Rights: The Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (June 9, 1993).   
178  See Christian Green, Between Blasphemy And Critique: Freedom of 
Religion and Freedom of Speech, 29 J.L. & RELIGION 176, 176–79 (2014); 
Bielefeldt, supra note 14, 45–47; Allison G. Belnap, Defamation of Religions: A 
Vague and Overbroad Theory that Threatens Basic Human Rights, BYU L. 
REV. 635–86 (2010); see Sejal Parmar, The Challenge of “Defamation of 
Religions” to Freedom of Expression and the International Human Rights 
System, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 353 (2009); Berry & Rehman, supra note 
168, at 432.  
179  U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission on Human Rts., Report on 
the Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/82 (Mar. 22–Apr. 30, 
1999). 
180  See Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 
(Apr. 12, 2011) (combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and 
stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence 
against, persons based on religion or belief); see also Rabb, supra note 136, at 
178–79 (calling this a ‘“seismic shift” (at 179)).   
181  See U.N., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Human Rights Council 
on its eighteenth session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/2 (Oct. 14, 2011). 
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V. LEGAL CLAIMS RELATED TO OFFENCES TO SENSIBILITIES  
 
A. Difficulties in Striking the Right Balance    
 
 In spite of these clear political indications, at a legal level 
there is still debate about the legitimacy of limits on free speech 
when it comes to freedom of expression and religious 
sensibilities. The debate is fuelled by two shortcomings of the 
human rights system.   
 The first is that the human rights instruments provide no 
clear indication as to where exactly “draw the line;” it ultimately 
falls upon courts to decide. Most likely this is done ad hoc in 
each and every specific case. This is however an extremely 
challenging task,182 particularly when minority beliefs are at 
stake. The European Court for instance, which is the body that 
could give guiding lines to other regional bodies as well as to 
domestic courts, has not developed a consistent approach on the 
specific matter of sensibilities. 183  Hence, while the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has had no hesitation to 
condemn Chile for censoring Scorsese’s “Last Temptation of 
Christ” on national television (the film has been also banned 
repeatedly in other countries, including France, Greece, South 
Africa, Israel, and the Philippines),184 the European Court, has 
still been hesitant in other relevant cases.185 There have been 
indeed indications that offenses to sensibilities are now 
excluded from the protective scope of Article 10 of the European 
                                                
182  See also Bielefeldt, supra note 14, at 40.  
183  Ian Leigh, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t: the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religion from Attack, 2 RES 
PUBLICA 55, 67–70 (2011); Ilias Trispiotis, The Duty to Respect Religious 
Feelings: Insights from European Human Rights Law, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
499, 529 (2013); Paul Kearns, The Judicial Nemesis: Artistic Freedom and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 1 IRISH L.J. 56, 70–71 (2012). 
184  See Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C), No.73, (Feb. 5, 2001). 
185  See Wingrove v. United Kingdom App. No. 17419/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1996); Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1994). (older case concerning State religion); see also Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler v. Austria, App. No. 68354/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (the last relevant 
judgment in which the Court decided on religious sensibilities,  in favor of 
freedom of expression, yet dividing the Court by four votes to three). Two 
relevant cases against Russia are still pending: Samodurov & Vasilovskaya v. 
Russia, App. No. 3007/06 (2009) (admissibility decision regarding the 
vandalism of artworks in the Sakharov Musem), and Alekhina and Others v. 
Russia, App. No. 38004/12 (2012) (regarding the imprisonment of the Punk 
rock group Pussy Riot).  
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Convention in freedom of expression cases, 186  yet, in more 
controversial cases, the Court still appears to be largely relying 
on its margin of appreciation doctrine.187 The sole indication 
consistently present in the jurisprudence of the Court, as well as 
in that of the Human Rights Committee and other human rights 
bodies,188 is that restrictions to freedom of expression should be 
interpreted narrowly.189 The approach of the UN Human Rights 
Committee is also illustrative of the strains that the human 
rights bodies have to face while explicitly condemning 
blasphemy laws. During the adoption of the final general 
comment 34 on Article 19 of the I.C.C.P.R. in late 2010 and mid-
2011, the Committee has not been as straightforward as it could 
be. Comparing the draft190 and the text that was finally adopted, 
191 the Committee did not observe a per se incompatibility of 
criminal blasphemy laws with international standards. Namely, 
contrary to the first draft, the Committee noted in the final text 
that “[p]rohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or 
other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible 
                                                
186  See e.g. Jeroen Temperman, Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions and 
Human Rights Law, 26 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 517, at 543–45 (2008); Trispiotis, 
supra note 183, at 550–51; see also Eleni Polymenopoulou, Does one Swallow 
Make a Spring? Artistic and Literary Freedom at the European Court of 
Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14 
n.73 and 76–78 and accompanying text (referring to Tatlav v. Turkey (2006), 
Giniewski v. France (2006) and Klein v. Slovakia (2006)) (on file with author).  
187  See Polymenopoulou, supra note 186, at 18–20 nn.97–104 and 
accompanying text.  
188  See Conference Room Paper #3, 49–62, in OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (“OHCHR”) (expert meeting 
on the Links Between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR: Freedom of Expression 
and Advocacy of Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to 
Discrimination, Hostility or Violence (Oct. 2–3, 2008) (providing an overview of 
these bodies jurisprudence and the clarification between the limits in 
particular the Nazila Ghanea), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Freedom 
Opinion/Articles19-20/2008Seminar/Pages/ExpertPapers.aspx; Parmar, 
supra note 178, at 364–73. 
189  See Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 39–40 
(1986); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 63 
(1992); see also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
Recommendation on Hate Speech (Oct. 8, 1997). 
190 U.N., Human Rts. Committee, Draft general comment No. 34 (Upon 
completion of the first reading by the Human Rights Committee), ¶ 50, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5 (Jan. 25 2010) (“States parties should repeal 
criminal law provisions on blasphemy,” adding again however, that this 
prohibition, “. . . should not be understood in a manner inconsistent with 
paragraph 3 of Article 19 or other provisions of the Covenant.”). 
191 U.N., Human Rts. Committee, General comment No. 34, Article 19: 
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with the Covenant.”192 Yet, it added explicitly, “except in the 
specific circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of 
the Covenant.” 193  This addition, however, implies that 
blasphemy laws, in the view of the Committee, may still be 
compatible with the Covenant while their purpose is to prohibit 
hate speech (e.g. article 20 paragraph 2). Such conclusion 
however, adds to the confusion between blasphemy and hate 
speech. 
The second shortcoming is that the international 
community is not an ideal one where all states agree to assign 
the same importance and the same meaning to religious 
freedom. At present, a mutual agreement is far from reality. As 
domestic practice is in fact dependent on the states’ various 
legal and religious traditions, the weight assigned to religion 
varies substantially from one context to another. The difference 
is particularly striking between religious194 and secular states. 
Yet, the large majority of the so-called western member states 
also maintain criminal blasphemy laws. Although inactive in 
many cases, these laws do remain in the criminal codes of states 
such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, while 
Ireland has only recently reintroduced them.195 States with an 
official religion or in which religion holds a powerful status in 
the public sphere such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, or 
Greece, 196  provide for more stringent punishments, with 
punishments ranging from six months to three years of 
imprisonment. 197  To my knowledge, there is only one 
jurisdiction that has explicitly rejected the balancing approach 
in matters related to freedom of speech—namely, the United 
States Supreme Court. This Court applies the First Amendment 
as the rule and a variety of tests, 198 without needing to balance 
competing interests—in fact, being quite explicit in rejecting 
balancing in matters related to freedom of expression. 199 In 
                                                
192  Id. ¶ 48. 
193  Id. 
194  See supra section III(b). 
195  See also Temperman, supra note 186, at 519–20. 
196  Report by the Venice Commission, supra note 139. 
197  See e.g. POINKOS KODIKAS [P.K.] [CRIMINAL CODE] 7:198–99 (Greece) 
(providing for punishments of 3 years of imprisonment in Greek Criminal 
Code).  
198  See John Bellinger III & Murad Hussain, The Great Divide and the 
Common Ground Between the United States and the Rest of the World, in 
ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 172–73 (Envor, Ellis & 
Glahn eds., 2012); IAN CRAM, CONTESTED WORDS: LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (2006). 
199  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959). 
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addition, it is only this court that has been consistently 
following a unique practice of dissociation between law and 
religions, clarifying since the 1960s (in a case concerning 
Rossellini’s film The Miracle) that “it is not the business of 
government in [the American] nation to suppress real or 
imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether 
they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.”200  
With such extreme varieties in domestic practice, the 
lack of consensus becomes a rather problematic aspect of 
freedom of expression controversies. Cartoons such as those 
published in Charlie Hebdo or in Jyllands Postern could 
undoubtedly be perceived as offensive for Muslims; in fact, 
under an extremist perspective of Sharia law they could be 
easily considered as either sabb or irtidad, 201  even shirk 202 
under Sharia law. In international human rights law, however, 
rights such as freedom of expression and religious freedom are a 
priori equal.203 Hence, a “negative” protection in the sense of 
“not being offended” is rightly not included in the scope of the 
right to religious freedom. Such extension would be 
incompatible with the interpretation of the scope of the forum 
externum of religious freedom.204 There is therefore no need to 
balance freedom of expression against beliefs; freedom of 
expression prevails in any way.205 As per the current human 
                                                
200  Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled on this case in 1952, following a controversy on 
Rossellini’s film, which recites the story of a shepherdess who gets pregnant by 
a vagabond, taking him by mistake for Jesus. Id. The Court has not changed 
its position of offenses to sensibilities since then. In 1998, it created public 
outrage by affirming the right of a yellow-press magazine to parody in an 
extreme way a popular Christian Minister, and in 2011, it upheld the right of 
a church congregation proclaiming slogans such as “Pope in Hell” and “Priests 
Rape Boys” in the public sideway next to the funeral of a former U.S. marine 
soldier sent to Iraq, See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 461 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
201  HASHEMI, supra note 136, at 25; see also Wiederhold, supra note 138, 
at 39.  
202  See supra, notes 54–74 and accompanying text. 
203  The only exception from this a priori equality is the prohibition of 
derogation from religious freedom in a state of emergency—see art. 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”); see also Peter 
Danchin, Of prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of 
Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, 258–59 (2008) (making a 
parallel with the ‘over-stretched’ protection of religious freedom in the case of 
proselytism). 
204  See Kearns, supra note 183; George Letsas, supra note 25, at 239.  
205  See Trispiotis, supra note 183, at 507 (arguing that the balancing 
exercise has significant weaknesses); Temperman, supra note 186, at 517 
(arguing that “the two rights do as a rule not need to be balanced-for it is 
precisely when the two rights are balanced without a legal necessity to do so 
that human rights law is undermined”).  
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rights standards, only prohibitions of hate speech, advocacy or 
incitement to hatred are lawful,206 as well as prohibitions to 
prevent discrimination against a specific religious group that 
can identify as a racial minority according to the current 
interpretation of the notions “race” and “ethnicity” by the CERD 
Committee.207   
 
B. Defending Minority Claims? 
  
And yet, the assertion that freedom of expression should 
always prevail seems to be somewhat rigid. There is no doubt 
that controversies such as the Danish cartoons or Charlie Hebdo 
are ultimately very little, if at all, associated to the substance of 
religions. They might not even be associated with the offense of 
blasphemy as such. In the multi-cultural western European 
cities in particular, a backlash on religious Muslim minorities 
has been visible following each incident of Islamic extremism,208 
raising questions of tolerance in multicultural societies. Quite 
clearly, equality issues for religious minorities are also at stake. 
In fact, unless one is able to prove either incitement to hatred or 
intent of discrimination against a specific religious group that 
can also identify as either an ethnic or racial group, in which 
cases the ICERD would be applicable,209 religious minorities—as 
well as migrants of minority faiths—are not collectively 
protected from “offenses to sensibilities” that amount to hurt 
their sensibilities. The argument that those feelings offended 
could have avoided being exposed to the cartoons210 seems also 
irrelevant in the context of a globalized world, where the mass 
media and internet communications allow extremely rapid 
exchanges of information. Several authors seem to have already 
implied this danger: Keane, for instance, who makes the point of 
                                                
206  See International Covention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination Dec. 21, 1965, art. 4(a), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 20. On the links between the two 
provisions, see OHCHR supra note 188. 
207  See The Jewish community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, 
CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, ¶¶ 8–10 (U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination Aug. 22, 2005); Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, 
CERD/C/66/D/33/2003, §7.3  (Mar. 4, 2004); U.N., Rep. of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (Sep. 15, 1993). 
208  See Blumberg, supra note 8. 
209  See supra notes 216–17.  
210  As the dissenting European Court of Human Rights judges pointed in 
a case concerning a novel considered blasphemous in Turkey, “nobody is ever 
obliged to buy or read a novel, and those who do so are entitled to seek redress 
in the courts for anything they consider blasphemous and repugnant to their 
faith.” See, I.A. v Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., dissenting 
opinions, ¶ 5 (2005). 
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a clash between freedom of expression and “religious tolerance” 
rather than freedom while discussing the Danish controversy,211 
and Nathwani who takes the view that religious feelings do 
deserve protection when minority religions are at play.212  
In spite of the noble reasoning, arguments in favour of 
minority rights should not be maintained in controversies 
involving sensibilities. Discrimination and hatred against 
Muslim minorities have also served as formal justifications of 
all the “defamation of religions” debate. Indeed, the content of 
the resolutions was never meant to initiate blasphemy 
prosecutions, but rather “to take all appropriate measures to 
combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, 
intimidation and coercion motivated by religious intolerance . . . 
and to encourage understanding, tolerance and respect in 
matters relating to freedom of religion or belief.”213  
Furthermore, an interpretation of the human rights 
standards on either religious freedom or intolerance as 
including offences to sensibilities would create immense 
confusion between victimless religious offences and personal 
offenses 214  and would allow excessive leeway to states to 
advance their public interests largely facilitated blasphemy 
persecutions,215 perpetuating a model of virtual “clash” between 
cultural systems and systems of beliefs. It is quite illustrative 
that, despite the alleged end of the “defamations of religions 
debate,” the notions of religion, culture and tradition are still 
utilized not only at a domestic level, but also at the level of the 
United Nations political bodies. For example, in June 2011, i.e. 
three months after the issue of blasphemy was allegedly 
“buried,” the row sparked again, this time by the voting of the 
Council in favor of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
(SOGI) rights.216 OIC member states, along with African states, 
                                                
211  Keane, supra note 9, at 845.  
212  Niraj Nathwani, Religious Cartoons and Human Rights, 13 EUR. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 488, 506 (2008) (“in my opinion, a minority religion 
connected to ethnic identity deserves more protection than a majority religion, 
because a minority religion often serves simply as a proxy of ethnic identity. 
However, who is the majority and who the minority might be difficult to 
establish in a global affair like the Danish cartoon affair.”). 
213  See supra notes 180–82. 
214  See Trispiotis supra note 183, at 529; Letsas, supra note 25, at 239 
(arguing that ‘free speech prevails without any competition with other 
values’).  
215  See Green supra note 178, at 180–81 (2014); Parmar supra note 178, 
at 358 (2009); Bielefeldt supra note 14, at 36; Berry & Rehman supra note 168 
451–54 (referring to Pakistan –see especially also references to the OIC Astana 
Declaration 2011). 
216  Human Rights Council Res. 17/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/19 (July 
14, 2011). See generally, Rehman & Polymenopoulou supra note 112, at 39. 
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voted against that first SOGI Resolution, pressuring the 
international community not to recognize non-discrimination 
and equality claims for LGBT communities. 217  The SOGI 
resolution was followed by other similar, somewhat more 
generic debates, this time on the notion of the notion,” which 
appears to be the new battleground in the United Nations. 
Hence, the OIC and African states have joined Russia in a new 
controversial resolution on the ing the international community 
no.”218 This use of the notion of tradition, however, which is one 
that omits the dynamic concept of culture, has already had a 
visible impact in the area of equality in family rights,219 and 
may, in the future, have an impact also on the enjoyment of 
other universal rights and equality claims. 
One should not forget, in addition, that the aim and 
punishment of blasphemy laws is heavily contested among 
Muslims. In fact, various scholars have been calling for 
Islamic law reform in the modern era, including by a contextual 
interpretation of controversial verses—what An-Na’im has 
identified as a “constructivist approach to human rights, 
through a reinterpretation of the Sharia.”220 Such claims have 
been particularly evident in various areas of human rights, from 
slavery221 to gender equality,222 and from religious minorities 
debates223 to children rights.224 Undoubtedly, they could also be 
                                                
217  Nineteen states voted against this resolution. See Rehman & 
Polymenopoulou supra note 112, at 42 n.187. 
218  U.N. Human Rts. Council, Promoting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Through a Better Understanding of Traditional 
Values of Humankind: Best Practices, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ /21/L.2 (Sept. 21, 
2012) (draft, sponsored by Pakistan (on behalf of the OIC) and other member 
States); Human Rights Council Res. 21/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/3 (Oct. 9, 
2012) (adopted by 25 votes in favor, 15 against and 7 abstentions, in view of 
“promoting a better understanding of traditional values”). 
219  See, e.g., U.N. Human Rts. Council, Protection of the family, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/26/L.37 (June 24, 2014) (draft) (sponsored by the U.S., the E.U. 
and western member states); U.N. Human Rts. Council, Protection of the 
family, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.20/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014), (draft) (sponsored by 
OIC and African states).  
220  An-Na’im supra note 29, at 17; M.K. Nawaz, The concept of Human 
Rights in Islamic Law, 11 HOWARD L.J. 325 (1965); see also AN-NA’IM supra 
note 138, at 80 (arguing that “it is possible to develop [universal cultural 
legitimacy] retrospectively through enlightened interpretation of human rights 
norms”).  
221  An-Na’im, supra note 29, at 22–23. 
222  As an indication only, see Niaz Shah, Women’s Human Rights in the 
Koran, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 868 (2006), reprinted in 2 ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 149, at 18–19; Alex B. Leeman, Interfaith Marriage in Islam, 84 
INDIANA L.J. 743, 762–63 (2009), reprinted in id. at 148–49; Rehman supra 
note 165, at 164–67.  
223  Peiffer, supra note 149, at 546–47; Berry & Rehman supra note 168, 
at 453–67.  
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put forward in the case of religious freedom and blasphemy 
claims. The reason is precisely, as Niaz Shah puts it, that “they 
could also be put forward in the case of religious freedom and 
blasphemy claims. The reason is precisely, as Niaz Shah puts it, 
“we do not have Islamic States as were conceived by the Koran 
and practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and it is only in such 
as state where Islamic laws could be enforced”225 Further, not 
allowing a contemporary interpretation of Islam seems to be 
undermining the value specifically attributed to Islam as an 
autonomous legal tradition that maintains an extremely well-
developed literature and jurisprudence also on legal matters. 
Interpretation is an extensive chapter in Islamic law and 
encompasses a number of interpretative rules and principles—
including extremely flexible tools, such as the ijtihad (individual 
reasoning), which, contrary to the divine revelation and 
prophetic legislation which ended the death of the Prophet, 
ijtihad “connotes a continuous process of development.”226  
 
VI. TOWARDS A MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURAL 
RIGHTS  
 
Rather than seeking to resolve an extremely complicated 
dilemma as a legal issue, a more fruitful pathway would be 
perhaps to adopt a holistic approach to culture and religion—
primarily by empowering cultural rights. Since blasphemy 
controversies are fuelled by legitimate religious minorities’ 
claims, it seems quite clear that the pathway to follow would be 
to enforce religious minority cultural rights more effectively—
especially in states where religious minorities suffer the most. 
In fact, still today unfortunately, a number of UN member 
states avoid international human rights mechanisms’ scrutiny 
by the UN expert bodies in cultural and religious matters. 
States of the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
or Oman, along with the United States, have never even signed 
the ICESCR; others like Pakistan (since 2008) and Bahrain 
(since 2007) have only become parties very recently; states such 
                                                                                                         
224  O’Sullivan, supra note 31, at 187; Kamran Hashemi, Religious Legal 
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Complexities in Applying the Sharia in Modern State Practices, 62(2) N. IRL. 
LEG. Q. 153, 154 (2011). 
225  Shah, supra note 222, at 394. 
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as Kuwait, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Iraq are parties for years now, 
yet have never, or almost never, sent to the Committee periodic 
reports for examination. 227   Others have been neglecting 
entirely their cultural and cultural minority heritage. For 
instance, Pakistan where “hundreds of Hindu temples and other 
heritage sites across the country including the national heritage 
of Buddha statues” have not been restored since their 
destruction in the 1990s228 or Syria that has been using the 
Aleppo Citadel229 as a military base, entirely disregarding 2014 
Security Council resolution that orders it to refrain “from 
attacking cultural objects and sites and to not use them for 
military purposes.” 230 As for the UNESCO instruments, they 
are the ones that enjoy truly universal acceptance, and also the 
highest numbers of ratifications 231 —a rather uncommon 
situation in multilateral treaties. Yet, these mechanisms do not 
allow for close scrutiny, if only by the UNESCO 
intergovernmental committees. It is therefore not surprising 
that Muslim states that typically oppose human rights 
instruments such as the ICESCR,232 CEDAW,233 and the CRC,234 
                                                
227  E.g. the only concluding observations of the HR Comm. for Iraq, 
E/C.12/1/Add.17, 12/12/1997; report for Egypt due in 20 Jun 2003, submitted 
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2013, E/C.12/EGY/CO/2–4. 
228  U.N., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Consideration Of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 9 of The 
Convention, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/PAK/CO/20 (Mar. 4, 2009) (no mention in the 
final CERD Concluding observations). 
229  See ISLAMIC ART AND VISUAL CULTURE , supra note 73 (providing the 
importance and description of the Aleppo citadel). 
230  S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014). The resolution also “calls on all parties 
to act immediately to save [its] rich societal mosaic and cultural heritage, and 
take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of Syria’s World Heritage 
Sites.” Id. 
231  As of June 2015, the 1972 Convention enjoys 192 ratifications 
(including Palestine), with the only exception of newly formed States such as 
Tuvalu, Timor-Leste and South Sudan. Likewise, the 2005 Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 190 (only 
the US and Israel refused to ratify); the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 161 ratifications and even 
the Convention on ‘Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property’ is ratified by 127 
Member States. Only the, more challenging, 2001 Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage that acknowledges 
underwater cultural heritage as  ‘an  integral  part  of  the  cultural heritage of 
humanity’ has less (50) ratifications; it is however, ratified by Palestine, as 
well as by Iran and Libya. 
232  See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, State Reservations to the ICESCR: A critique 
of Selected Reservations, 26 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 340 (2008) (discussing the 
example of Pakistan). 
233  See e.g., Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the 
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have posed virtually no reservations in the cultural heritage 
and cultural diversity instruments. 
On the other hand, the international bodies should 
continue reminding states that culture should not be associated 
necessarily with religion, or tradition—and especially not with 
traditions that question or endanger the underlying values of 
human rights. 235  At present, all instruments that protect 
cultural diversity include clauses that indicate their 
compatibility with present human rights standards—abuse 
clauses, limitations clauses, or clauses of compatibility with 
other international instruments. The fact that the meaning and 
scope of “the right to culture” is not clearly defined in 
international instruments should no longer provide a good 
excuse for relativist claims, as both the UNESCO and the ESCR 
Committee have given adequate clarifications with respect to 
the meaning of “culture”236—especially in relation to its dynamic 
character and its association with a culture of humanity.237 
Consequently, religious reasons cannot possibly be brought 
forward as an objection to human rights law. As noted 
repeatedly by international human rights bodies, human rights 
are not subject to divergent interpretations under the pretext of 
religion, tradition, or culture.238 The Committee of Economic, 
                                                                                                         
643 (1989–1990). 
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with the elaboration of already existing rights . . . .”). On the contribution of 
the Committee, see  Athanasios Yupsanis, The Meaning of ‘Culture’ in Article 
15 (1)(a) of the ICESCR – Positive Aspects of CESCR’s General Comment No. 
21 for the Safeguarding of Minority Cultures, 55 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 
356 n.61 (2012). 
237  See U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 supra note 236, at ¶ 12. In the wording of 
the Committee, culture “must be seen not as a series of isolated manifestations 
or hermetic compartments, but as an interactive process whereby individuals 
and communities, while preserving their specificities and purposes, give 
expression to the culture of humanity.” Id.; see also, Ann-Belinda Preis, 
Human Rights as Cultural Practice, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 286 (1996). 
238  See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and 
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Social and Cultural Rights (“ESCR Committee”) in particular 
has clarified, first, that the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) is not 
dependent upon any particular political, economic, or other 
system;239 and, second, that domestic law should be interpreted 
as far as possible in a way that conforms to a state's 
international legal obligations.240 In the case of the practice of 
condemnation for apostasy through fatwas for instance, the 
Human Rights Committee has been quite clear in observing 
that “[s]tates parties also violate the right to security of person 
if they purport to exercise jurisdiction over a person outside 
their territory by issuing a fatwa or similar death sentence 
authorizing the killing of the victim.”241  
That being said, a meaningful implementation of cultural 
rights, should not be confined to United Nations mechanisms. 
Attention should be paid to the local implementation of human 
rights standards, including by domestic legislation 
implementing obligations stemming from cultural rights. Such 
implementation cannot be done without the active participation 
of civil societies. Artists, comic cartoonists, illustrators and 
literature writers—especially those writing in the mass media 
or publishing or performing widely—play a central role in this. 
Those in mass media are not random individuals—they are 
actors of the civil society and important members of political 
life, if not also mechanisms of social transformation. Their 
freedom of expression is not gratuitous, neither endless; it is 
precisely for this reason that freedom of expression is the only 
human right to be accompanied by duties and responsibilities.242 
It also falls upon them therefore to develop their own criteria, 
deontology rules and codes of practice243  rather than acting 
                                                
239  Compare U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 supra note 240, at ¶ 18, with U.N., 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2  ¶  1. 
In particular,  the nature of States parties’ obligations (Dec.14, 1990) §8, U.N. 
Doc. E/1991/23 (in relation to the ‘neutrality’ of the Covenant). 
240  U.N. ESCR Committee, General Comment No.9 (1998), in relation to 
the domestic application of the Covenant (Dec. 3 1998) §15, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/24 (1998).  
241  U.N., Human Rts. Comm., General comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty 
and security of the person), n. 15, U.N. Doc., CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014); 
see also, e.g. Concluding observations: Islamic Republic of Iran, §9, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.25 (1993). 
242  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
art. 19 (“this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions . . .”); European Convention on 
Human Rights, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950 (reminding us that “the exercise of these 
freedoms . . . carries with it duties and responsibilities.”). 
243  See e.g., Boualem Bessaih, An ethics of responsibility for artists, in 
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under the covering of the “I have a right to” approach. Rights 
are not a panacea; they have limits, and most importantly, are 
co-related to duties. Accordingly, it equally falls upon the 
leaders of spiritual and cultural traditions to give direction to 
those who wish to oppose offenses to sensibilities and peacefully 
manifest their claims, as well as to fight against extremist 
interpretations of religions. In this, Islamic law can make an 
important contribution.244 Perhaps in the future, new types of 
bodies and fora will be created that will be better placed than 
courts to decide where exactly to “draw the line”; and this, in the 
interest of respect for cultural diversity of humankind, as well 
as its maintenance for both present and future generations.   
  
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper looked into controversies over religious 
sensibilities. It found that the international bodies have 
clarified in many instances that cultural and religious reasons 
cannot provide a valid justification for human rights violations. 
Killings and death threats in particular, including by fatwas, 
are situations that are condemned by international bodies. They 
are also widely contested within the Islamic tradition, and 
particularly with modern interpretations of Sharia law.  
Further, artistic traditions of the Muslim world, 
especially those during the life of the Prophet and the early rise 
of Islam, prove that there has never been a sole monolithic 
understanding of the position of Islam vis-à-vis the arts, and 
further, that Islam, despite the stringent religious prohibitions, 
has been at the crossroad of cultural and artistic exchanges. 
Consequently claims of absolute bans on music and iconography 
should be dissociated from religious justifications. Iconoclastic 
policies, intentional destruction of heritage and other similar 
acts in particular, should trigger international responsibility as 
acts of terrorism, and therefore also violate humanitarian law.  
As for domestic laws restricting freedom of expression on 
the grounds of protecting religious beliefs, the answer is less 
straightforward. Since the “defamation of religions” campaign 
ended in 2010, the international community has been clearer in 
rejecting blasphemy laws. The absence of consensus among 
states however, and the persistent politicization of the concepts 
of “religion” and “tradition” within the United Nations, makes 
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enforcement of human rights standards an extremely 
challenging task. For this reason, human rights bodies, 
including regional courts and universal bodies, appear to be 
rather inadequate mechanisms—if not entirely inappropriate 
ones.  
From there, two pathways seem possible: either to 
declare the inability of the human rights system to address 
global scale controversies involving religious sensibilities, or to 
re-approach them from a holistic perspective, empowering 
cultural rights as a whole and posing the emphasis not only on 
the rights as such, but also, on the duties accompanying them. 
Which of the two solutions is the adequate one? The first 
undermines the credibility of the human rights system and 
should therefore not be preferred. The second, on the contrary, 
would have a dual benefit. First, it would allow addressing a 
specific point of the Islamic legal tradition, which is not 
compatible with the human rights system, through the lens of a 
modern interpretation of Sharia scholarship. Second, it would 
enable dialogue and understanding between different religions 
and different traditions. For this approach, however, courts 
seem to be the least adequate forum.  
